RACE, VIOLENCE, AND URBAN TERRITORIALITY

Cleveland’s Little Italy and the 1966 Hough Uprising

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A racially motivated shooting during the 1966 Hough uprising in Cleveland, Ohio, provides an effective lens to scrutinize the complicated legacy of racialized violence with which the Little Italy neighborhood, where the shooting took place, had become associated. White residents’ localized racial anxieties stemmed from a trend toward increased interracial contact in public spaces and particularly the public schools—which in turn linked to population movements in the nearby vicinity and metropolitan area as a whole. Little Italy’s residents historically marked their territory and sought to ward off racial residential transition through the use of violence, but ultimately their success depended on location, the neighborhood’s unique geography, and an easing of the city’s housing shortage for African Americans by the 1970s. Little Italy today is a gentrifying cultural hub with few (if any) black residents; meanwhile, attempts are being made to moderate its reputation for racial intolerance.

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When Warren LaRiche fatally shot Benoris Toney in the early morning hours of July 23, 1966, amid the seven days of civil disorder known in Cleveland as the Hough riots, the mainstream media counted Toney simply as one of the four people who died in connection with the uprising—all of whom were African Americans killed by white civilians and, evidently, law enforcement personnel. But to count Toney as a Hough casualty is not just to disregard the extraordinary circumstances of the case but in fact to also decontextualize the incident. LaRiche shot Toney well outside of Hough, the black neighborhood where the uprising took place—in fact, some forty city blocks away from its epicenter—in an area that saw no other incidents of violence and that was being heavily patrolled by the Ohio National Guard. To fully fathom the circumstances behind the shooting, we must scrutinize the community from which LaRiche came and that he maintained he had been part of an organized effort to “protect”: Cleveland’s Little Italy. As much as it was a direct response

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to what was going on in Hough, Toney’s shooting was a manifestation of the neighborhood’s deep-seated, racialized anxieties that were more than a decade in the making. In fact, the incident was one of the most widely publicized examples of racially motivated violence with which Little Italy came to be associated, an occurrence that served to intensify and make visible an assortment of long-standing tensions with links all the way back to the neighborhood’s early history. As will be seen, residents like LaRiche periodically used such expressions of violence in attempting to “mark” neighborhood territory, and their actions went a considerable way toward discouraging African Americans from frequenting the area, let alone attempting to settle there.

Compact and located at the city’s periphery, hemmed in by geographic and manmade barriers, Little Italy was comparatively easy to “defend” by those residents who were so inclined. At the same time, the neighborhood was not simply a static ethnic community untouched by larger forces shaping the changing, postwar city. Burgeoning suburbanization by upwardly mobile white city residents, in conjunction with a severe housing shortage for African Americans dating at least to World War II, set up a complex dialectic whereby entire sections of the city underwent rapid demographic turnover in the 1950s and 1960s, a process historians have termed racial residential transition.1 While Little Italy experienced significant demographic changes, it did not, however, become virtually all black like the surrounding Cleveland neighborhoods—and, for that matter, most of the city’s traditional European ethnic enclaves. Few, if any, African Americans live in Little Italy even today, making the neighborhood an exception that demands we consider the extent to which this outcome resulted from residents’ attempts to limit or prevent incursions by African Americans through the use of violence.

Historians have taken divergent approaches in seeking to explain residential transition and the broader topic of racial conflict in postwar U.S. cities. Some, most notably Ronald Formisano, explored how whites’ ethnic and localized identities linked to territoriality in conflicts over public school desegregation and housing.2 Gerald Gamm and John T. McGreevy have stressed the importance of community institutions, noting that members of Roman Catholic ethnic groups built more permanent, less “portable” religious edifices than Jews, making them more likely to stay put.3 Other historians, led by Arnold Hirsch and Thomas Sugrue, emphasize the role of larger structures—housing policy, discriminatory lending, local labor markets, and economic bases—alongside the exclusionary actions of white residents in fostering racially unequal access to housing and other resources. Indeed, Sugrue contends that structure provides both the context for and limits within which human agency unfolds.4 This essay explores these various emphases by juxtaposing Cleveland’s Little Italy with Hough and introducing the additional complicating factor of relative geography. In an era of social and political ferment, the comparatively intimate settings of neighborhood and public school became sites of particularly intransigent racial conflict lasting into the 1970s, as black and white Clevelanders’
previously separated lives crossed in unprecedented ways. As a particular case, Little Italy points the way toward a more comprehensive understanding of the complex perceptual, socioeconomic, political, and geographic factors that made racialized violence a tactic in the territorialization of urban space.

THE CASE

The only certainties surrounding the shooting are that LaRiche and two other men were parked at a gas station on Euclid Avenue at the edge of Little Italy around 2:30 a.m., when Toney, on his way home from having dropped off a coworker as a favor, pulled into the parking lot of an adjacent lumberyard. Suspicious of Toney’s presence, LaRiche and his companions apparently drove up behind him and parked, at which point Toney put his vehicle in reverse and pulled up alongside them. By then, LaRiche and Toney were aiming guns at each other—it is impossible to determine, however, whether Toney pointed first and LaRiche in self-defense, as LaRiche would claim at his subsequent trial, or the other way around. LaRiche fired twice, wounding Toney in the face; he died in the hospital the following day. Police stationed nearby were close enough to see LaRiche fire the second shot and flee on foot. As crowds of local residents gathered on the scene, police and guardsmen sought to disperse them and restore calm.5

Benoris Toney, age twenty-nine, was married and the father of five young sons. He worked in the shipping department of a parts foundry on Cleveland’s West Side. Newspapers reported that he had a second job and that his wife Nareace also worked, which was not uncommon for an African American family striving for economic security. The Toneys rented in Hough; according to Nareace, they had been hoping to buy a house soon. They had moved to Cleveland six years earlier from Memphis, Tennessee, apparently following Nareace’s father as part of the ongoing migration of southern blacks to the urban North in search of a better life. Nareace testified at LaRiche’s trial that her husband had carried a gun for “about two years,” for protection. She stated that she had not wanted her husband to go out, considering the tense situation surrounding the disorders, and stated, “He felt bad about all that burning [in Hough],” but that he had left after one of his coworkers telephoned twice, asking for a ride home because his car had broken down.6

Warren “Butchie” LaRiche, age twenty-eight, was engaged to be remarried at the time of the incident and had an adopted son. He was a forklift driver at Picker X-Ray Corporation near Cleveland’s eastern city limits. He lived on East 120th Street in Little Italy and so did one of the other men with him that night—Patsy Sabetta, his next-door neighbor and the owner and driver of the car. Sabetta was a twenty-one-year-old state highway department laborer. LaRiche had been convicted of shooting with the intent to wound in 1956, and he had been questioned in connection with another shooting in 1963. In the
1956 case, LaRiche, then a senior at Cleveland’s Collinwood High School, confronted a youth who had flashed a gun at LaRiche’s younger brother at a drive-in movie theater, precipitating a “pistol battle” in which LaRiche gravely wounded the other. As he would years later in the Toney shooting, LaRiche claimed self-defense, saying, “I shot . . . because I was afraid he’d kill me.” LaRiche got probation after spending a month in jail, his defense having been bolstered by four of his teachers, who testified on his behalf as character witnesses.

Newspaper reports on the LaRiche-Toney incident soon revealed that residents (presumably men) of the Little Italy neighborhood, inspired by “[f]ear that rioters might invade the area,” had met in secret that very night to set up a system of armed patrols. Curiously, this was five days into the uprising and four days after National Guard protection had been extended as far as Little Italy. LaRiche himself, in an interview before his trial, would claim, “By Friday, everybody was carrying a gun. It was an armed camp. Everybody had heard the colored people were going to come up the hill and burn us out.” “All week long,” he continued, “everywhere you went, all you heard about was the riots. . . . In bars and restaurants it was all everybody talked about. The people stood on the streets and they were afraid.” Indeed, from the six suspects at the crime scene, police officers recovered not only the shotgun that killed Toney but also a rifle and three revolvers. The previous night, police had been summoned to Little Italy to disperse a crowd of restless youths, one of whom spoke as if a confrontation with the Hough rebels were imminent. The same evening as the shooting, someone called in a report of a sniper on the lumber company roof, resulting in searches (one even using a police helicopter) that found no one. Then, just a few hours before Toney was shot, two neighborhood youths injured themselves when they accidentally discharged a shotgun, catalyzing rumors that “two white boys had been shot by Negroes.” Several times during the night, police had to disperse crowds on the streets. It was with this background in mind, LaRiche claimed, that he and his associates had ventured over to the gas station and the confrontation with Toney took place.

Why did such racialized fears run rampant, when there was actually no evidence to indicate that civil disorder in Hough would spread to affect Little Italy directly? As will be seen, the police passing on information to Little Italy residents was an absolutely crucial factor. To fully understand how such feelings could develop, however, the record of beliefs regarding African Americans and the encounters that neighborhood residents had with them in the decade or so preceding the Hough uprising must be carefully considered.

CONTEXT

Historically only one of several Italian immigrant enclaves around the city, by the 1960s, Little Italy was Cleveland’s most prominent Italian neighbor-
hood, a reputation it enjoys to this day. This development was remarkable, however, because Little Italy’s population had declined steadily since the 1920s, and it had itself spawned several secondary settlements in nearby areas.  

Situated in a ravine at Cleveland’s eastern edge and bordered by a cemetery, railroad tracks, and the adjacent suburbs of Cleveland Heights and East Cleveland (see Figure 1), Little Italy stood out as the city’s Italian population dispersed—while African American settlement expanded on Cleveland’s East Side, encompassing most of the other formerly Italian areas, Little Italy remained exclusively white. Across Euclid Avenue to the north of Little Italy, though, the first black families were moving into Glenville’s Forest Hills

Figure 1: Cleveland’s Little Italy and Surrounding Area, c. 1970
NOTE: Detail; block numbers removed. Coincidentally, the large asterisk marks the approximate spot where Benoris Toney was shot.
section. The neighborhood’s prominent Alta House Social Settlement in fact identified “feeling . . . about the changing population in fringe parts of the area” as what lay behind a “series of assaults on Negroes” beginning as early as 1951, which the agency recalled as marking the advent of racial conflict in Little Italy. By 1957, Alta House staff was reporting,

There is a keen awareness on the part of the Alta residents of the recent racial changes in the population of the nearby Wade Park–Ashbury areas [Forest Hills]. This has become a threat in the minds of some Alta residents to the degree that there have been acts of violence indicating intense anti-Negro feeling.

In that area just north of Little Italy, there were six racially motivated bombings between 1952 and the spring of 1954 alone. Certainly, the process of black in-migration lay close to the heart of the LaRiche-Toney incident. But the historic dynamics of racial residential transition have been much more complex than whites simply fleeing neighborhoods in response to African Americans moving in.

First and foremost, the way in which upwardly mobile whites moving to outlying suburban areas created housing opportunities for African Americans tends to be overlooked. This movement was underwritten by low-interest Federal Housing Administration and other government loans, which were effectively denied to blacks. By the 1950s, large numbers of Italian and other Southern and Eastern European Americans were moving from Cleveland to nearby suburbs in a bid for better housing in keeping with their rising socioeconomic status. This movement often occurred along “corridors”—notably, out of Little Italy along Mayfield Road into Cleveland Heights, South Euclid, Lyndhurst, and Mayfield Heights. According to the 1960 U.S. Census, the “Italian stock” (defined as foreign-born Italians and their children) population of South Euclid already numbered 2,466, considerably larger than that of Little Italy at 1,965; by 1970, as suburbanization continued, South Euclid’s Italian-stock population would rise to approximately three times Little Italy’s, standing at 2,871 as compared to 975. During that same decade, the Italian-stock totals for Lyndhurst and Mayfield Heights each grew to more than double the number remaining in Little Italy. Meanwhile, Little Italy’s total population continued on a downward slope, shrinking by one-quarter from 1960 to 1970, from 4,724 down to 3,520. This additional figure provides an important qualification to estimations around the time of the LaRiche-Toney incident that, counting third- and fourth-generation individuals, the neighborhood remained between two-thirds and three-fourths Italian American. Already in 1960, Alta House had noted that the neighborhood’s “prosperous and often more stable families” were moving out, to be replaced by Appalachian whites and college students, as well as some recent arrivals from Italy. Strikingly, then, Cleveland’s most prominent Italian neighborhood both shrank and became less Italian—even while remaining exclusively white.
In effect, Little Italy’s existence throughout the years has been most “threatened” not by blacks moving in but by the departure of its residents for the suburbs—not to mention the territorial encroachments of nearby Case Western Reserve University. Black residential transition possibly influenced this demographic transformation, although it is worth noting that the same pattern of Italian dispersal prevailed on Cleveland’s West Side, which had no significant African American population in 1970 (compare Figures 2 and 3). Thus, while the prospect of racial residential transition undoubtedly figured in the minds of many white city residents in the 1960s, the actual impact of black in-migration is best gauged in those outlying areas to which whites moved in a bid for better housing yet which nevertheless underwent rapid turnover from white to black—in this case, between 1960 and 1970. Focusing on such areas controls for migration out of older neighborhoods that would likely have occurred anyway, so that we may clearly see the effect that African Americans moving in could have on whites deciding to leave.

The southwestern quarter of East Cleveland immediately bordering the neighborhood fits this description exactly. Increasing numbers of Italian and other working-class whites had moved into that suburb’s aging but spacious homes between 1950 and 1960 as they achieved a higher economic status.

Figure 2: Italian Ancestry by Census Tract, Cuyahoga County, Ohio, 1960
SOURCE: Adapted from Real Property Inventory of Metropolitan Cleveland, A-Sheet-a-Week (September 21, 1962).
Nearby East Cleveland (as well as Forest Hills) was also attractive to Italians moving out of Little Italy because they could retain convenient ties such as their parish affiliation. In fact, at the time of his murder trial, it was reported that Warren LaRiche’s parents “live[d] next door to a Negro family” on Wadena Street in East Cleveland. In 1960, African Americans made up only 2 percent of East Cleveland’s population and were almost totally restricted to the westernmost of the city’s ten census tracts. Just one decade later, however, East Cleveland’s demographics had been dramatically changed by an unrelenting spate of “blockbusting” — a process whereby realtors ruthlessly exploited white homeowners’ fears of racial transition to produce a rapid turnover. By 1970, a burgeoning African American population already comprised 59 percent of the suburb’s total, with four of the city’s ten census tracts having black concentrations ranging from 77 up to 91 percent. This transformation took place notwithstanding the fact that the blacks arriving in this decade were overwhelmingly middle class and in spite of a major public relations campaign to address white fears concerning integration launched in 1963. But despite this effort, the trend proved unstoppable: as African Americans increasingly found East Cleveland a desirable place to live, Italian Americans and other whites found it less so. East Cleveland’s Italian-stock population plunged from 2,199 in 1960 to just 637 ten years later, with none whatsoever remaining.
in the tract immediately bordering Little Italy. A 1972 study would conclude that the bulk of these out-migrants moved to the aforementioned suburbs along Mayfield Road.22

At least indirectly, then, housing competition in nearby neighborhoods helped to shape racialized anxieties among Little Italy residents. One resident of fifty years said in 1985, apparently referring to the surrounding black neighborhoods, “I really feel that we’re prisoners in our own neighborhood. The only way to get out is to drive out. You can’t just walk out. There’s no feeling of security here.” Going further, he applied a “siege” metaphor to the historic process of racial residential transition, saying,

Wouldn’t it be wonderful if we could all live together. . . . But these people see what happened in Kinsman and East Cleveland and Notre Dame [other formerly Italian areas] and they say, “See what happens if we let our guard down?”23

This assessment covertly acknowledged Little Italy’s local reputation for racial intolerance—the oft-mentioned reality that the neighborhood was “off limits” to African Americans on the threat of physical violence, particularly after daytime business hours.24 And although it is extremely unlikely, considering suburbanization, that any large proportion of Little Italy residents were “refugees” from other formerly Italian areas, at least some not-yet-established or lower-income Italian Americans returned to (or simply remained in) Little Italy due to its comparatively affordable housing. Notably, household incomes for Little Italy residents around this time were said to be “modest,”25 adding a dimension of class and status concerns to the racialized fears of the residents.

One example of a former resident who moved back to Little Italy from the surrounding city neighborhoods was Warren LaRiche himself. Although reportedly “born and reared” in Little Italy, in the mid-1950s LaRiche was living with his family on East 112th Street off Superior Avenue in Forest Hills. Mentioned earlier as an integrating area, the LaRiche family’s presence and experiences there justify at least some speculations. We know where LaRiche lived due to a newspaper report of a fight, precipitated when he was allegedly attacked on the bus by two students from Patrick Henry Junior High School—a school that LaRiche himself had almost surely attended and that by the autumn of 1954 was paralyzed by racial clashes and a “strike” (boycott) organized by white students. Although the newspaper scrupulously avoided mention of race, it is quite possible that the Patrick Henry students who fought with LaRiche were black. In the earlier-mentioned 1956 shooting case involving LaRiche, his father had revealed at the trial that the youth bought a pistol “because there had been trouble with prowlers,” a clue that may indicate apprehension at the appearance of African Americans in the Forest Hills neighborhood.26 While definitive evidence to support these speculations is obviously lacking, we can at least surmise that by the time that LaRiche’s parents lived next to a black family in East Cleveland, they already had firsthand experience
with racial residential transition; LaRiche’s own motivations for moving back to Little Italy remain indeterminable, however.

As much as they might try to isolate themselves, residents of Little Italy could not easily avoid encountering African Americans. LaRiche claimed to be unprejudiced and to have “known a lot of Negroes at work and at school.” Regardless of whether they knew African Americans personally, East Side whites formed notions as they inevitably passed through black neighborhoods while commuting to work in the city’s factories, offices, and warehouses or else shopping downtown. On his way to work, LaRiche would have traversed the entire length of an increasingly black East Cleveland. De facto segregation in the Cleveland public schools considerably restricted Little Italy residents’ contact with African Americans there, but students typically on their way to Collinwood High School would have passed through East Cleveland, too. Daily encounters with blacks were also a fact of life for the large number of neighborhood residents who attended nearby Catholic high schools, particularly Cathedral Latin—located near the edge of the Hough neighborhood—and Ursuline Academy in East Cleveland. Generally unaware of the structural factors underlying racial residential transition and subsequent deterioration—most importantly, discrimination by lenders and an unstable employment base—whites, on viewing these neighborhoods, attributed their appearance to the supposed character flaws of the black residents themselves.

One final, dramatic incident worth mentioning shaped negative views of African Americans among Little Italy residents in the years immediately preceding the LaRiche-Toney incident: the 1964 protest by local civil rights groups against the degrading treatment received by black students being bussed into the neighborhood to attend Murray Hill Elementary School, which was met with a violent counterreaction. Prior to their court-ordered desegregation in 1976, Cleveland’s public schools in the early 1960s saw overcrowding in those located in black neighborhoods and underenrollment in those located in white ones. With some 14,000 of the city’s African American students on half-days in a paltry attempt to address this imbalance, in 1962 the school board planned a number of new facilities—but well within the boundaries of black settlement, thus effectively perpetuating the segregated status quo. This strategy drew harsh criticism from local civil rights groups, who coalesced into the United Freedom Movement (UFM) to fight the plan. In the meantime, as the new schools were being built, black students were temporarily bussed to classes in “white” schools. At Murray Hill Elementary School in Little Italy, black students from nearby Glenville were restricted to separate classrooms, barred from using the swimming pool or cafeteria, and permitted to use the gymnasium and toilets only at designated times. In conjunction with race-related antagonism, Little Italy residents’ punitive refusal to accept a full participation of the Glenville students was magnified by their strong identification with the school, which since its founding in 1916
had been unusually accommodating toward the neighborhood and respectful of its Italian immigrant culture. Not only did Murray Hill have probably the best facilities of any Cleveland elementary school, but into the 1930s its curriculum had also included a special English-language immersion program based around pride in Italian origins. The school had also led neighborhood improvement efforts, including a highly visible and supposedly successful campaign against juvenile delinquency in the late 1940s. In fact, the relationship between Murray Hill School and the neighborhood had been so positive that Holy Rosary, the Catholic parish to which the overwhelming majority of the residents belonged, saw no need for a parochial school until 1954. No doubt, neighborhood residents had come to regard Murray Hill School as their own private resource, and they resented any assertion of supralocal authority such as the bussing program. The UFM decided to picket Murray Hill and two other elementary schools when no concessions beyond “diffusing” a proportion of the black students among the white students for “at least one period each day” could be achieved. 31

On January 30, 1964, as protesters were gathering in a nearby parking lot in preparation to picket Murray Hill, 1,500 angry residents thronged the streets and violently clashed with police and local media, preventing access to the school and battering several cars being driven by African American passers-through. Trapped and with police unwilling to intervene, the protesters after more than an hour’s standoff had no choice but to cancel the demonstration and file past a swearing, spitting mob throwing projectiles, kicks, and punches in their own version of “civil disorder.” 32 Responding to this controversy, the Cleveland Board of Education in February passed a resolution to intermingle the Glenville children with the rest of the students in the receiving schools, but at the same time the board reiterated that the bussing arrangements were only temporary. Alta House subsequently proved its efficacy and apparent stature in the neighborhood when it somehow convinced the residents to accept the compromise; anger and racial tension would remain rife into the summer, however, climaxing one night in July when up to 300 neighborhood residents massed to pelt the cars of two black motorists with bricks and bottles. 33

HOUGH

Just as Little Italy residents confronted the 1966 Hough uprising with a variety of preformed notions about African Americans and the neighborhoods they inhabited, black Clevelanders’ own experiences shaped starkly contrasting views. Having suffered through a severe housing shortage dating back to the World War II era, African Americans with the economic means were by the 1960s increasingly able to move to outlying areas of the city’s East Side and a few suburban areas such as East Cleveland that seemed to offer better quality housing and living conditions. 34 Yet even they faced discrimination from
lenders and frequently the antagonism of white neighbors. Those blacks who could not afford such moves were much more limited in their options and were forced to remain within central-city areas that formed the core of a steadily expanding, low-income ghetto district that eventually came to encompass the Hough neighborhood.

Hough by the late 1950s was at the end of a trajectory East Cleveland would later face: from upper-class white to working-class white, then rapidly from middle-class black to mostly working-class and poor black. Exacerbating this process was the displacement associated with Cleveland’s ambitious urban renewal program, which added some 15,000 to those who crammed into Hough’s enormous late nineteenth-century houses as they were further and further subdivided into apartments, and allowed to decay by apathetic slum-lords. The appalling social conditions widespread in the neighborhood, worsened by outrageous rates for substandard housing, exploitative prices for food and other necessities in the area’s business establishments, and numerous incidents of harassment by the police, gave the impression that Hough was primed to explode, which it did on Monday, July 18, 1966, when a black man ordering takeout was refused a drink of water by one of the white co-owners of a bar on East 79th Street and Hough Avenue.35

Of the four black lives lost during the subsequent Hough riots, only two were directly related to the uprising occurring in Hough itself. Both of these were innocent bystanders: a young mother confined by police on the second floor of an apartment building who became frantic about her children’s safety, and a middle-aged man on his way to help a friend board up his business establishment. A third fatality, like Toney only secondarily related to the uprising if at all, was an older man shot while waiting for the bus on Kinsman Road in Southeast Cleveland—by a white assailant, he stated before he died. Forty-six people were injured in the uprising, including a dozen police officers. Nearly 300 individuals were arrested in connection with incidents of vandalism, looting, and some 240 incidents of arson that cost $1-2 million in property damage. Firefighters coming to put out the blazes reported having hoses cut and rocks and other objects thrown at them; police reported “sniper fire,” although no sniper was ever apprehended. The uprising centered on the business district along Hough Avenue near East 79th Street, but fires were set all over the neighborhood. After the first two nights of civil disorder, Mayor Ralph Locher called in 1,700 National Guardsmen, who were deployed broadly over most of Cleveland’s East Side. The disorder then gradually wound down during the next several days; Friday evening, hours before Benoris Toney would be shot, was actually the quietest since the uprising began, conditions in Hough being “almost normal.” Hough Avenue businesses would reopen on July 25, one week after the initial outbreak.36

Broadly speaking, white and African American perspectives on the Hough Riots and other such urban uprisings of the 1960s were irreconcilable.37 Most whites regarded the disorders as totally irresponsible, wanton violence that
threatened them personally. Precautionary measures verging on martial law shocked some nearby white residents into a state of panic. Many whites also found urban uprisings incomprehensible, believing that under Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society,” African Americans were gaining more rights and protections than ever before. Analyses of urban uprisings emphasizing the underlying social conditions that created frustration in black inner-city neighborhoods, such as the 1968 Kerner Commission Report, were rejected by the white public. Instead, blame for disorders breaking out was more likely to be pinned on “instigators,” such as the Communist Party or African American militant and nationalist organizations. Significantly, Cleveland’s all-white Cuyahoga County Grand Jury Commission published a report on the Hough uprising that virtually singled out black militant Lewis Robinson’s “JFK House” (named after both John F. Kennedy and Jomo Freedom Kenyatta) as responsible, drawing the most tenuous connections and relying heavily on hearsay.

In contrast, although few African Americans condoned urban uprisings, they understood these to be the product of bitter frustration on the part of inner-city residents who despite civil rights legislation still faced grim life prospects: meager job opportunities in the face of deindustrialization, deteriorated housing, substandard schools, police harassment, and economic exploitation at the hands of landlords and local merchants. Some observers, in fact, have declined to describe these uprisings using the term *riots* at all. The violence associated with urban uprisings was not planned but spontaneous, and not random but generally directed at businesses perceived as responsible for poor social conditions in the ghetto. Ironically, some white observers saw this “selective looting” as further evidence of “outside planning.” Contrary to white fears of “invasion,” urban uprisings were ad hoc protest actions not intended to leave the confines of poor black neighborhoods, lashing out at the “ invisibility” of these areas to the white public at large. And as for black militants who advocated armed struggle, fundamentally they were seeking control of their own communities, facing off with police on the grounds of autonomy and “self-defense.” Despite their occasional braggadocio, they knew that to press further, into white neighborhoods, was not only contrary to these purposes but also suicidal.

Cleveland’s African American community took numerous steps to counteract the mainstream account of the Hough riots. A group of Hough residents approached Mayor Locher three days into the uprising, hoping to make him aware of the social conditions that had primed Hough to explode. Days after the uprising ended, the local Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) chapter condemned law enforcement’s heavy-handedness and also accused police of “negligence and neglect of duty in controlling armed bands of marauding vigilantes in the Murray Hill-Mayfield area which resulted in a brutal murder.” In mid-August, the Cleveland branches of both the NAACP and the Urban League criticized the implications of the grand jury report, the latter joining
with State Representative and future Cleveland Mayor Carl B. Stokes to call for a federal investigation. Going further, local black civil rights leaders formed a Citizens Committee on Hough Disturbances that sponsored hearings to document Hough residents’ side of the story. Attended by some 250 persons, the initiative’s 154 pages of testimony not only sketched the social underpinnings of the uprising but also recorded numerous incidents of police brutality and misconduct in suppressing it, many against innocent bystanders and nonparticipants. Finally, Cleveland’s main black paper, Call & Post, carried similar exposés of police brutality and likewise condemned the grand jury report, while simultaneously disapproving of civil disorder as self-defeating and instead advocating strong black leadership as the solution to the problems of low-income African American communities.

THE TRIAL

In the aftermath of the Hough uprising and in the months before Warren LaRiche’s trial for second-degree murder got under way, both Cleveland’s African American community and Little Italy mobilized around the incident. Nareace Toney, who had initially considered taking her sons back to Memphis, decided to remain in Cleveland; as she told the press, “[A]mong other things, I want my children to have a good education. And all things considered, the education here is better than down in Memphis—and my children are now the most important thing to me.” Weighing racism in the North and the South, she added that leaving would “only be running away from something here that’s much worse down there.” Mrs. Toney received cash assistance from the Hough Opportunity Center’s Hough Emergency Assistance Fund, while the pastor of a Hough Baptist church initiated a college education fund for her children. An additional $1,200 came from a Toney family benefit event sponsored by Cleveland CORE, held in early September at a local nightclub.

Four days after the shooting, Little Italy’s main business and civic organization since 1961, the Mayfield–Murray Hill District Council, released a policy statement on the incident “[i]n response to publicity associating the Little Italy community with violence and disorder.” Described by its drafters as “a responsible and calming statement . . . [that] emphasized the law-abiding nature of the Mayfield-Murray Hill residents,” it placed faith in “law-enforcing agencies” and pledged cooperation with them. With a stretch, the council’s statement could be construed as a disapproval of LaRiche and other neighborhood residents having taken the law into their own hands. Its conviction, however, that “those who instigate these [violent] incidents should be punished for causing personal injury and property damage and for seriously endangering the safety of every man, woman, and child living in the neighborhood and wider community” in effect abdicated responsibility, openly pointing a finger toward Hough instead. On a more grassroots level, a door-to-door collection the day
after the shooting had raised $2,000 for LaRiche and Sabetta’s legal defense. With this money, the codefendants’ families retained attorney Adrian B. Fink Jr., a complex and flamboyant personality who in his prior career as a public defender had won several controversial acquittals for murder.46

The LaRiche-Sabetta second-degree murder trial commenced February 15, 1967, and hinged on the question of “whether LaRiche killed Toney in self-defense or whether Toney had his revolver pointed at LaRiche in self-defense.” The prosecution obviously had to extrapolate in lieu of Toney’s version of the events. Assistant County Prosecutor Leo M. Spellacy posited that Toney had hefted his weapon only after seeing LaRiche aiming at him. Spellacy stressed that LaRiche and Sabetta had twice been ordered out of the area by National Guardsmen in the hours before the incident and had stashed multiple firearms in the car. He argued,

You can’t be the aggressor and plead self defense. These men went into the parking lot looking for Toney, and they killed him. Toney was guilty of two crimes. One, he was a Negro, and secondly, he mistakenly parked his car in a lot on Euclid Avenue.

Spellacy also conjectured that LaRiche would have had difficulty getting the lengthy shotgun out the car’s back window on seeing Toney pointing a gun at him; rather, “The gun must have been sticking out of the window long before they pulled up alongside Toney’s car.” Spellacy’s closing statement, however, that “Hough Avenue was wrong—absolutely wrong—just as Murray Hill was wrong,” demonstrated his inability to disassociate Toney from what had been happening in Hough, which unwittingly played to the defense. It was the prosecution, too, that called the trial’s most crucial witness: Michael Jacobucci, a seventeen-year-old high school student, who had also been in Sabetta’s car at the time of the incident. Having occupied the passenger seat, Jacobucci could not resolve whether LaRiche was already pointing the gun, but his assertions that Toney had backed up with his weapon drawn and that he himself had shouted, “He’s got a gun,” before LaRiche fired the first shot certainly bolstered the defense’s case.57

Fink’s opening motions to have LaRiche and Sabetta acquitted or the charges reduced to manslaughter were both overruled. The defense pointed to Toney’s “visibly pitted” 38-caliber pistol as proof that he had been pointing the weapon at LaRiche when LaRiche fired, shotgun pellets having damaged the gun. When LaRiche took the stand, he said of Toney, “We thought he was going to burn the lumber yard. . . . It wasn’t time to phone for police. We drove into the lot and I hollered, ‘Hey fellow, what are you doing here?’” LaRiche claimed that Toney had responded, “‘White man, you’re dead’ or something like that.” “The whole terrible thing took only five seconds,” LaRiche recalled. “I was scared and apprehensive. . . . I thought he was going to kill me, kill us all. . . . I swooped down and raised my shotgun and pulled the trigger.” LaRiche
said he then jumped out of the car and, afraid Toney was coming after him, turned and fired a second shot before discarding the weapon and fleeing.38

LaRiche’s testimony conjured up the emotional climate that motivated Little Italy residents to arm themselves during the ongoing Hough uprising, and it revealed the instigative role that law enforcement played in the outcome. He described the residents as “frightened and apprehensive,” saying, “We had heard constant rumors that the colored people were going to move in on us.” In response, “We got together in the neighborhood and formed groups to seal off the area for safety. . . . There were hundreds of men organized. Nobody went looking for trouble, it was for our own protection.” LaRiche admitted to placing the loaded shotgun in Sabetta’s car earlier that evening and apparently divulged that he had been assigned to guard the specific area where the shooting took place. But again the question arises: why did Little Italy residents mobilize five days into the Hough uprising and four days after National Guard units had been extended to encompass the neighborhood? Here, law enforcement can clearly be implicated for passing on misinformation. LaRiche stated, “A policeman told me they [Black Nationalists] had threatened to blow up our section, that snipers would move in,” and, “At one point a National Guardsman told us they had grabbed three armed colored men in a nearby cemetery.” The testimony of Patrolman James Burke under questioning by Fink confirmed widespread talk not only of snipers but also concerning “the blowing up of water mains.” No factual basis was ever found for any of these rumors. Burke admitted that police had gone door-to-door advising residents to “govern themselves accordingly,” but under cross-examination he emphatically denied that this amounted to approval of the residents taking up arms. Militant Lewis G. Robinson’s own memoir reveals that local law enforcement’s inept harassment, surveillance, and infiltration of Black Nationalist organizations such as the JFK House comprised the seedbed for these rumors. Fink would conclude LaRiche and Sabetta’s defense by comparing their actions to those of “American pioneers protecting kith and kin,” a provocative linking of their armed mobilization and the country’s larger history of white supremacy.39

Following the testimony, presiding Judge John J. McMahon in a surprise move discharged Sabetta “on grounds of insufficient evidence of aiding LaRiche.” Then, the all-white jury entered what would amount to two days of deliberations. Struggling with the legal definitions of self-defense and second-degree murder, the jurors proved unable to reach a verdict after twelve hours, at which point McMahon dismissed them as hung, necessitating a retrial for LaRiche. Although not a complete victory for the defense, Fink declared, “I thought he [LaRiche] had a fair trial,” and that “at the next trial the truth shall win out.” Apart from a few crank calls and phone threats, the defense had little reason to complain about the first trial’s outcome.40

While prosecutor Spellacy said of the jury, “I’m sure they tried their very best to be fair to both sides,” Nareace Toney condemned the outcome as a case
of “Mississippi Justice.” “It was a tough case,” she told reporters sarcastically. “Do you think my husband would be walking around free if he shot a white man?” “Day after day,” she said,

I began to get the impression that my husband was on trial, not the men accused of killing him. . . . I hope the next trial will be to secure justice for the killing of a man who was alone and minding his own business.

Sensing a racial double standard, Mrs. Toney asked, “[C]an you imagine policemen knocking on door[s] in Hough, telling them to get ready [for] the people from Murray Hill?” Still, she felt, “Someone on the jury must have had a sense of justice or they would have just let him [LaRiche] go.” In her final assessment, however, Mrs. Toney was pessimistic. “I doubt that the next trial will be any better,” she opined. “That man is going to go free. Only way they’re going to convict him is if he shoots a white man.” Cleveland CORE was similarly critical, particularly of Sabetta’s acquittal, and called on the U.S. Civil Rights Commission to investigate “whether the conduct of the prosecution was as vigorous, and reflected as much zeal for justice, as is displayed in prosecutions against Negroes.”

As Mrs. Toney predicted, LaRiche’s second murder trial in December 1967 would bring no resolution for her and her supporters, because both sides evidently rehashed the exact same evidence and arguments. The new trial took just five days, and its all-white jury deliberated only two-and-a-half hours before acquitting LaRiche. “I knew it had to come out that way,” LaRiche later told the press. “That’s the only way it could be.” Fink seemed to dismiss the killing and offered a simplistic explanation for the outbreak of racialized violence with his statement,

We’re all to blame for allowing the situation to exist that permits people to get into such a mood. . . . We cannot blame the Negro population for what an extremist one-percent did, nor can we blame the whites for what extremists aroused in their area.

To the end questioning Toney’s right to be in the vicinity of Little Italy, Fink continued,

No one knows for sure what Toney was doing down there . . . but one thing is clear—if he had stayed home, this would not have happened. . . . During times of panic and violence, people ought to remain in their homes rather than subject themselves to the hazards of a riot environment.

Ironically, Fink failed to notice how this recommendation, if applied consistently, would surely have applied to his own client as well.
IMPLICATIONS

One might be tempted to interpret the LaRiche-Toney case in the framework of racial identity formation, following those historians who have in recent years argued that Southern and Eastern European immigrants coming to the United States in the early twentieth century, including Italians, were not automatically accepted by the host society as “white,” nor did they automatically identify as such on arrival. 53 The most thoroughgoing and cogent interpretation along these lines has concluded that while the whiteness of Italian immigrants and their children was never seriously in question, they found little reason to identify as whites per se before World War II. 54 It goes without saying that as of the 1960s, Italian Americans’ claim on white racial identity was secure. Even so, one cannot help but feel tantalized by the claim in a 1969 neighborhood development report that

the need to adjust to surrounding areas which are Black, and to a diverse student and faculty population . . . has put them [the residents] again in the position of a disadvantaged minority which they had been before and during the 1930s.

In the early twentieth century, Little Italy had indeed been subjected to overzealous policing due to the imagined and real presence of illegal activities like gambling and bootlegging, and had been stigmatized with an “unsavory” reputation in the local press. Even as the community became accepted by mainstream society, telltale concerns with lawfulness remained. As late as 1964, Alta House staff would note, besides the residents’ animosity toward African Americans, a “[r]esentment of the conventional authority of the Police which results in a controlled lawlessness in the area.” 55

Perceived slights to Little Italy’s reputation have never been taken lightly by business owners, local politicians, and upwardly mobile residents, however. 56 It is worth returning to the Mayfield–Murray Hill District Council’s worries about the neighborhood being linked with “violence and disorder.” The issue of lawlessness, with its potential to stigmatize an entire neighborhood as in the case of Hough, came up again after LaRiche’s inconclusive first trial, when these same neighborhood leaders fretted over publicity portraying Little Italy as “a bigoted, racially-inspired neighborhood.” 57 The council’s concerns seem overblown; with the possible exception of the earliest reports, newspaper coverage was, to say the least, even-handed. Although it raised some uncomfortable issues for the neighborhood, it can be argued that the LaRiche-Toney incident and the defense’s symbolic manipulation of race at the trial ultimately served to underline both the whiteness and citizenly character of the residents. Facing the specter of the Hough riots and of black militants like JFK House’s Robinson, the white public as represented by the jury apparently concluded that Italian Americans were the law-abiding community, while African
Americans were not; and that Italians should have the right to bear and use arms to defend their property, while blacks, it would seem, should not. The potential for irony here and a possible racial double standard were not lost on Nareace Toney or the black civil rights observers following the case.

The LaRiche-Toney incident itself apparently did little to change minds or the patterns of racialized violence in Little Italy. Between the first and second LaRiche trials, in fact, Little Italy’s councilman, Anthony J. Garofoli, had gone on record as advising the city administration that, in the event of another disturbance, “Unless the civil authorities can control the situation, people of my ward are ready to take action themselves.” That such views may have been widespread is suggested by a former resident who, in 1976, reminisced about Little Italy’s response to the Hough uprising and boasted, “Neighborhood mobilization takes no longer than a scant 30 minutes.” Neither were the Murray Hill School counterprotest and the LaRiche-Toney incident the last instances, unfortunately, in which Little Italy residents would direct violence at those perceived to be “outsiders.” In the spring of 1970, the beating of an African student enrolled at nearby Case Western Reserve University prompted mediation attempts by city and community leaders, and resulted in the Kenyan ambassador getting involved in the case. Later that summer, two black motorists’ cars were attacked by a stone-throwing mob estimated at fifty persons. But perhaps most dramatic was the July 1971 assault on a bus carrying black students through Little Italy to a summer sports program. Neighborhood youths, said to be “[m]en and women about 18 or 19,” broke out all but five of the vehicle’s windows with sticks and clubs, supposedly in response to the riders’ littering. The severity of the incident led Councilman Garofali to call for an investigation, and it prompted a formal apology from one of the Alta House trustees. Some Little Italy residents expressed their disapproval of such violence in addition to voicing concerns that the negative publicity would hurt the neighborhood’s reputation.

Anecdotal evidence indicates that the LaRiche-Toney incident and the legacy of racial violence of which it is a part persist as part of the community’s consciousness, and that some observers credit the area’s intolerant reputation for its “preservation.” Unlike so many other city neighborhoods, Little Italy never underwent racial residential transition; indeed, few if any African Americans live in the neighborhood even today, and many apparently avoid it, as claimed by a local columnist who recently wrote,

For African Americans in northeastern Ohio, fear of Little Italy has been fed to us along with our mother’s milk. Like a forbidden land filled with goblins, Little Italy is one of the few places in Cleveland where many blacks are uncomfortable, even just driving through.

Clearly, the neighborhood residents’ repeatedly demonstrated antagonism toward African Americans discouraged blacks from considering Little Italy as
a possible residential destination. The workings of larger, structural factors—
some discussed earlier—make it doubtful, however, that the violent exercise
of agency alone would have been sufficient to halt the force of racial transition.
By 1970, African Americans seeking housing could in effect bypass Little
Italy as the long-standing housing shortage they had faced in previous decades
abated considerably. While discrimination continued in practice, and good-
quality housing remained at a premium for those of limited means, many black
Clevelanders saw increased residential options as vast areas, heretofore solidly
white, opened up around the East Side (see Figure 4) and in certain suburbs
like East Cleveland, Shaker Heights, and Warrensville Heights. Civil rights
laws and reforms improving access to credit—as well as deindustrialization
that ended the city’s attractiveness as a destination for southern migrants—
also mitigated population pressures. Even as a counterexample, then, Cleve-
land’s Little Italy can teach us much about the interplay of agency, structure,
and geography in racial residential transition, and makes clear that to fully
understand this process, we must study interracial encounters in the context of
the broader urban milieu, not just on the neighborhood level.

Although African Americans have not moved into Little Italy, as already
discussed the neighborhood has been experiencing a substantial population
outflow of its traditional ethnic base ever since the 1920s. This trend only
accelerated in the 1970s and succeeding decades—raising the question of how
Little Italy has been able to persist as a stable residential area. On this particu-
lar question, perhaps the most important factor worth mentioning is the nearby
presence of Case Western Reserve University, which has provided the neigh-
borhood with a ready supply of students seeking rental housing. The fact that
many of these students are foreign and Asian is yet another nuance in the
neighborhood’s complicated racial legacy, and one that seems to suggest that
blackness trumps race per se in the minds of its white residents. Another rea-
son for the neighborhood’s persistence is the close proximity of Cleveland’s
many museums and other cultural amenities in the University Circle district
surrounding Little Italy, which has made the area as a whole a more attractive
location. Gentrification has even come to the neighborhood in recent years
with the construction of several condominium complexes.

In effect, Little Italy has been transformed from a vital ethnic neighborhood
into a venue for the reproduction and commoditization of Italian ethnic heri-
tage. Indeed, the promoters of Little Italy’s flourishing restaurants, art galler-
ies, and boutiques have for the past twenty years been trying—with mixed
results—to change the area’s reputation for racial intolerance so that its status
as a hub for artistic and culinary distinction can be consolidated. Much has
been made, for example, of Little Italy’s improved relationship with African
American local officials, or of the legacy of Bertha Blue, by all accounts a
well-loved African American teacher at Murray Hill Elementary School from
1904 to 1947. The procession at the annual Feast of the Assumption—an
event that every August brings thousands of former residents and (overwhelm-
ingly white) spectators into Little Italy—now features a sprinkling of black parade marshals. More than for the current residents of the “old neighborhood,” one cannot help but wonder what significance Little Italy’s racial legacy, of which the LaRiche-Toney incident is an important part, may have had in shaping the attitudes of those Italian Americans who ultimately moved to the East Side suburbs. While communities such as South Euclid and Lyndhurst have been integrating in earnest for the past decade or so, this process did not come easily. It should not be forgotten that these and the other “Hillcrest” suburbs had to be forcibly opened to black occupancy by lawsuits filed against...
realtors in 1979 or that the first black-owned house in Lyndhurst was fire-bombed in 1983. 64

NOTES

1. I investigated this topic with regard to a different section of the city, where the process was not generally characterized by violence, in my doctoral dissertation; Todd Michney, “Changing Neighborhoods: Race and Upward Mobility in Southeast Cleveland, 1930-1980” (PhD diss., University of Minnesota, 2004).


7. Plain Dealer, December 9, 1967; Plain Dealer, July 26, 1966; Cleveland Press, July 27, 1966; Cleveland Press, March 31, 1956; Plain Dealer, April 1, 1956; Cleveland Press, June 16, 1956; Cleveland Press, June 21, 1956; and Plain Dealer, June 21, 1956.


9. Gene Veronesi, Italian Americans and Their Communities of Cleveland (Cleveland, Ohio, 1979), 214-16; and Pat James Columbro, “The Italians of Cleveland, with Special Reference to the Mayfield Road Area” (master’s thesis, Western Reserve University, 1948), 18-19, 29-32. For a useful overview, see Charles Ferroni, “Italians,” in The Encyclopedia of Cleveland History, ed. David D. Van Tassel and John J. Grabowski (Cleveland, Ohio, 1986), 559-61.


11. Minutes, Group Work Council, Intercultural and Interracial Relations Committee, January 6, 1955, 4, Federation for Community Planning Records, container 36, folder 877, WRHS; “Request to the Cleveland Foundation,” March 5, 1957, Greater Cleveland Neighborhood Centers Association (GCNCA) Records, container 3, folder 45, WRHS; and Minutes, Community Relations Board, May 7, 1954, Anthony J. Celebreze Papers, container 1, folder 11, WRHS.

12. See Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York, 1985), 197-227. Gerald Gamm similarly emphasizes upwardly mobile whites’ relocation to the suburbs as driving racial residential transition; see Gamm, Urban Exodus, 16.

13. Donald Levy, Report on the Location of Ethnic Groups in Greater Cleveland (Cleveland, Ohio, 1972), 23; Cleveland News, September 20, 1957; and Plain Dealer, October 7, 1961. Karl Bonutti and George Prpic, in Selected Ethnic Communities of Cleveland: A Socio-Economic Study (Cleveland, Ohio, 1974), 176-78, use the term “ethnic corridors.”

14. U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Censuses of Population and Housing, 27; Real Property Inventory of Metropolitan Cleveland (hereafter, RPI), A Sheet-a-Week 30 (September 21, 1962); Veronesi, Italian Americans, 214, 298, 355-58; and RPI, A Sheet-a-Week 40 (October 6, 1972).


22. RPL, A Sheet-a-Week 30 (September 21, 1962), and 40 (October 6, 1972); and Levy, *Ethnic Groups*, 22. For context, see W. Dennis Keating, “East Cleveland,” in *The Suburban Racial Dilemma: Housing and Neighborhoods* (Philadelphia, 1994), 77-95; and the newsletter *Focus on East Cleveland*, East Cleveland League of Women Voters Records, container 3, folder 3, WRHS.


28. See “High Schools in Greater Cleveland,” (c. 1962), Alta Social Settlement Records, container 5, folder 3, WRHS. Not a single student was enrolled at nearby, predominantly black John Hay High School; in 1969, a neighborhood development report attributed the neighborhood’s abnormally high dropout rate to residents avoiding John Hay, LIDC, “Planning Report,” 6.


38. See “Special Grand Jury Report,” August 9, 1966, esp. 7-9, Grand Jury Association Records, container 4, folder 90, WRHS.


43. See *Call & Post*, July 23, 1966; *Call & Post*, July 30, 1966; *Call & Post*, August 6, 1966; *Call & Post*, August 13, 1966; and *Call & Post*, August 20, 1966.


45. Memorandum and attached statement, July 26, 1966, Alta House Records, container 1, folder 4, WRHS; and Board Minutes, September 15, 1966, Alta House Records, container 1, folder 4, WRHS.


55. LIDC, “Planning Report,” 5; Veronesi, Italian Americans, 239, 245; Minutes, Group Work Council, Intercultural and Interracial Relations Committee, January 6, 1955, 4; Rick Porrello, The Rise and Fall of the Cleveland Mafia (New York, 1995); and Alta House Consultant’s Report,” July-November 1964, Alta Social Settlement Records, container 2, folder 3. For a revealing example of 1930s press coverage, see Joseph A. Pignataro, ed., Nostalgia: Little Italy, Cleveland, Ohio (Cleveland, Ohio, 1983), 25.


60. Historians have followed Arnold Hirsch’s lead in referring to this process as “second ghetto” expansion. Some have acknowledged, however, that the process was driven largely by African Americans’ desire for better quality housing and was therefore shaped as much by black agency as by countervailing white resistance and structural factors. See Amanda Irene Seligman, “What Is the Second Ghetto?” Journal of Urban History 29 (March 2003): 275-76; Raymond A. Mohl, “The Second Ghetto Thesis and the Power of History,” Journal of Urban History 29 (March 2003): 250-51; and Raymond A. Mohl, “Making the Second Ghetto in Metropolitan Miami, 1940-1960,” in The New African American Urban History, ed. Kenneth W. Goings and Raymond A. Mohl (Thousand Oaks, Calif., 1996), 266-98, esp. 275-81. For an approach squarely centered on African American agency, see Michney, “Changing Neighborhoods.”

61. This pattern appears to have a historic precedent. In 1955, when racial anxiety over nearby black population movement was growing in Little Italy, Alta House staff reported that ten Japanese American families who had moved into the neighborhood during World War II were still living there, apparently unmolested. Minutes, Group Work Council, Intercultural and Interracial Relations Committee, February 3, 1955, 3, Federation for Community Planning Records, container 36, folder 877.


64. Cleveland Press, March 8, 1979; Cleveland Press, February 25, 1982; and Keating, Suburban Racial Dilemma, 302. On the mixed record of fair housing efforts in the “Hillcrest” suburbs, see Keating, Suburban Racial Dilemma, 180-87; see also the materials generated by the East Suburban Council for Open Communities and Hillcrest Neighbors in the George Gund Foundation Records, series II, container 57, folders 1325-27, and container 75, folders 1728-31, WRHS.

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