

Samuel “Golden Rule” Jones and Working Class Involvement in the Progressive Era

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The Progressive era has inspired a great debate among historians. As historian Robert Johnston frames it, numerous writers have attempted to champion or vilify the movement. Some view it as an honorable effort on the part of upper-class reformers to clean up corruption and reform life in a way more equitable to the lower classes. They view the movement as inclusive and admirable in its desire to aid those wronged by the current system. Others see it as an attempt by society's more privileged groups to reform society according to their strict moral standards, with little regard for the real concerns of the working class. They criticize the movement's near authoritarian nature in attempting to control the lives of those it claimed to be helping. These varied writers agree on the middle-class nature of the reformers and their supporters. Most historians acknowledge that the middle class more than any other social class was the catalyst behind these reforms. Additionally, historians agree that city government was the focus of most of the reform efforts. In order to understand how the middle class could become a force for reform, one must note the conditions of the cities at the time.¹

As the nineteenth century neared its conclusion, many Americans were startled at conditions within cities. Huge numbers of immigrants had moved into American cities. They faced terrible living and working conditions. They lived in run-down neighborhoods in substandard, densely packed housing. Families often sent children out to work, which made advancement in society nearly impossible. Political machines took advantage. Politicians realized they could secure this new block of votes in exchange for things like employment. They used patronage to fill positions within cities. With offices won using these voters, machines were able to bring corrupt practices into municipal politics. These politicians would sell contracts for personal profit and engage in graft. They did not do anything to change society in a way that

1. Johnston, Robert D. "Re-Democratizing the Progressive Era: The Politics of Progressive Era Political Historiography". *The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era*, Vol. 1 No. 1 (Jan. 2002), p.68-92. Online. 78-80, 86.

would allow immigrants to get out of their current situation. Rather, they offered the immigrants a short-term benefit so that they could continue to govern in a way that favored themselves and other high powered members of society. As the century neared its end, this system had a stranglehold on government in the nation's large cities.²

At the turn of the twentieth century a new generation of reform-minded politicians and citizens sought to change what they saw as a corrupt system in which officeholders filled their pockets at the expense of good government. The middle class was horrified by government corruption by city gangs full of immigrants. The exposure of Tammany Hall in New York was especially inflaming to those suspicious of machine politics. In response, numerous reform societies arose. They sought to remove corruption from city government and often to police morality among the poor citizens. Reform politicians were able to take office throughout the nation. Midwestern cities were home to some of the most famous of these Progressive mayors, notably Tom Johnson of Cleveland and Hazen Pingree of Detroit. Located in between these two great reformers was a lesser known, but equally dynamic mayor: Samuel M. Jones of Toledo.³

Jones had entered the United States as a working-class immigrant from Wales. By the time he was elected mayor, he was one of the wealthiest businessmen in the city and one of its most outspoken citizens. He advocated such radical ideas as the abandonment of parties and more typical progressive goals such as municipal ownership of utilities. His idea brought a new spark to municipal politics in Toledo, and the people loved him, electing him by one of the greatest margins in the city's history.

For all his exciting talk, however, modern historians have noted that Jones accomplished relatively little in his tenure as mayor. Although he had certainly changed the face of municipal

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2. Beunker, John D. *Urban Liberalism and Progressive Reform*. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973. 1-6
 3. DeMatteo, Arthur E. "Urban Reform, Politics, and the Working Class: Detroit, Toledo, and Cleveland, 1890-1922." *ProQuest Dissertations and Theses*; 1999; Proquest. iii.

politics with his independent candidacy, he did not achieve most of what he advocated. Historians have attributed this failure to Jones' opposition to parties. Because he refused to form a party around himself, he was unable to pass legislation, due to a lack of cooperation from Republican city officials.⁴ Jones's proposals for municipal ownership were repeatedly rejected by the city council. The problem was so severe that Jones actually attempted to change the city's charter in a way that would create a more favorable city council.⁵ This question raises another. Why did the people of Toledo love Jones so much if he failed to realize most of his promises? Contemporary sources attribute his popularity to a variety of sources, from his personality to the public hostility to the parties. This thesis will show that the people of Toledo voted for Jones because they were interested in the issues of the election. Using contemporary newspapers and the election results, this thesis will argue that Jones inspired support because of his platform.

Most of Jones' support came from the working class, and it seems that they were invested in his reform ideas.⁶ Certainly, the voters loved Jones for his personality, but they were also interested in the issues of the election. Working-class voters supported Jones's stance on party corruption, municipal reform, and liquor law enforcement. This is a contrast to the conventional idea that the middle class were the biggest supporters of progressive platforms. Jones's case presents an example that shows that the working class was more supportive than those of higher social status. Jones's version of Progressivism was inclusive and lacked the elitism which many critics of the movement condemn. Jones refused the idea of policing morality, which allowed him to reform without alienating the ethnic working class. In this way, he was more similar to politicians who favored urban liberalism, reform efforts that catered to working-class support,

4. DeMatteo, 89.

5. Jones, Marnie. *Holy Toledo: Religion and Politics in the Life of "Golden Rule" Jones*. University Press of Kentucky, 1998. 197.

6. DeMatteo, iii.

who came later. In 1899, voters were able to overlook the failures of his first term in the hope that he would deliver on his promises in his second. In this election the working class rallied around the cause of progressivism, while the middle class, who most historians expect to have been supporters, expressed their doubts.⁷

Samuel Jones's Entry Into Political Life

Samuel M. Jones's early life foretold little of the important role he would eventually play in municipal politics. Born on August 3, 1846, in the village of Bedd Gelert, Caernarvonshire, North Wales, Jones lived in a primitive stone cottage and had very little material wealth. When he was three years old, the Jones family moved to the U.S., settling in Lewis County, New York. Hugh Jones, Sam's father, worked in slate quarries. The family was able to survive without undue distress, but had nothing extra. Sam Jones spent most of his childhood between school and farm work, opting for school whenever possible. In his mid-teens, Jones's search for work would send him to different parts of the country.⁸

At the age of fourteen, while working on a steamboat, Jones received advice that he believed changed the course of his life. He was told to seek work in the oil fields, where he could supposedly earn a high wage, and he took this advice immediately. Enthusiastically, Jones arrived in the town of Titusville, Pennsylvania, "the headquarters and gateway, practically, of the oil regions." He excitedly traveled from well to well seeking employment, but found nothing. He spent many days at this task, a time that he viewed as one the most disheartening of his life, before coming upon a man who advised him to go to Pithole, Pennsylvania. The man gave Jones a letter to give to a friend who might find work for him. The advice paid off, and Jones found work in Pithole, at the rate of four dollars per day. The feelings of despair that had plagued him

7. Johnston, 86.

8. Jones, Samuel M. *The New Right: A Plea for Fair Play Through a More Just Social Order*. New York: Eastern Book Concern, 1899. Hyperion, 1975. 39-42.

since he had begun his search dissipated, and he recalled feeling satisfied. Before long, however, the town's oil, and its livelihood along with it, ran dry. Pithole virtually disappeared, as did Jones's stable employment. For the next few years, Jones worked various jobs in the oil fields.⁹

After a difficult period searching for work, Jones finally found a stable job in Pleasantville, Pennsylvania in 1868. With a stable income, he married Alma Bernice Curtiss in 1875, and the couple had three children: two boys, Percy and Paul, and a girl, Eva Belle, who died at the age of two. Shortly after the passing of her daughter, Alma Jones passed away as well. Jones referred to this period as the darkest of his life. In an effort to overcome this sadness, Jones moved to Lima, Ohio in 1886. It was here that Jones's luck in business began to improve. He was one of the first to drill for oil in Ohio as one of the original incorporators of the Ohio Oil Company, which was sold to Standard Oil in 1889. Six years later, in 1892, Jones married his second wife and moved to Toledo. In his first years in Toledo, he improved upon some of the machinery used to drill oil and founded the Acme Sucker Rod Company in 1894. The opening of the factory would change Jones's ideals significantly.¹⁰

Operating the factory opened Jones's eyes to the difficult conditions under which the working class struggled. He was startled by the number of men who came to him seeking work, and the wages and conditions to which they were accustomed. In the teeth of the depression of the 1890s, the struggles of Toledo's working class grew more dire.¹¹ These men reminded Jones of himself during his search for work, which helped him to sympathize with them. This led him to hang in his factory a sign inscribed with the rule that would become his namesake: the golden rule. There was to be one rule in Jones's factory: "Therefore whatsoever ye would that men

9. S. Jones, 42-52.

10. S. Jones, 52-60.

11. M. Jones, 66.

should do unto you, do ye so unto them.” This was the beginning of Jones’s transformation into a reformer.¹²

Jones’s inspiration for this rule, the posting of which he called “the first radical move” of his life, came from a variety of influences. The most important of these was his religion. Jones was a devout Christian who tried to live his life according to his interpretation of Christ’s teachings. This led him towards the idea of helping his fellow man and away from the competition inherent in the capitalist system, which he considered wholly unchristian. Jones frequently used religious terminology to explain his reform efforts, and for him, the two were inseparable. Instilled with this religious desire to help, Jones needed concrete ideas with which to do so. He found these in well-known reform minded writers of the day, most notably George Herron, Henry Demarest Lloyd, Washington Gladden, and Hazen Pingree.¹³

From each of these reformers, Jones took ideas with which he could fulfill his Christian duty to better society. George Herron was a major figure in the Social Gospel movement, which will be discussed later. Herron’s specific influence on Jones came from his focus on wealthy members of society. Herron advocated self-sacrifice for the benefit of others, and noted that wealthy businessmen were in the perfect position to do this.¹⁴ Jones’s personal philosophy was greatly indebted to this notion of self-sacrifice. Henry Demarest Lloyd was a New York lawyer famous for advocating the improvement of working conditions and for exposing corruption in big business.¹⁵ Jones took many of his ideas directly related to the golden rule from Lloyd. He referenced Lloyd when expressing the idea that workers should be treated as people and not as parts of a machine. Washington Gladden was a pastor who rose to prominence in Columbus,

12. S. Jones, 61-64.

13. M. Jones, 73-82.

14. Briggs, Mitchell Pirie. *George D. Herron and the European Settlement*. Stanford University Press: California, 1932. 10.

15. Jernigan, E. Jay. *Henry Demarest Lloyd*. G.K. Hall & Co., 1976. 9.

Ohio. He advocated unionization, which in turn inspired Jones to encourage his workers to join unions.¹⁶ The two exchanged letters frequently. Hazen Pingree was mayor of Detroit from 1889 to 1897. He was the closest thing to a role model that Jones had, although his ideas did not affect Jones much until after Jones became mayor.¹⁷ These men gave Jones many of the ideas that would inspire his reformist career.

The Social Gospel movement, advocated by Herron and Gladden, also served as the basis for many of Jones's thoughts. This was a popular movement during the Progressive era that applied Christian teaching to the nation's problems. The movement sought to encourage those with means to take responsibility for economic inequality and poor living conditions. As Jones said, his peers in business dismissed unemployment and poverty as a result of the times. This meant that it was not their problem, it was a natural phenomenon. The Social Gospel movement sought to encourage those in power to actively work towards solving these problems.¹⁸ It emphasized the importance of deeds over theology. The movement fit perfectly into Jones's mind. Already a deeply religious man, this movement aided him in his conclusion that it was his Christian duty to treat his workers fairly. He would continue to try to do right by the movement throughout his life.¹⁹

Other early signs of Jones's future as a reformer began to emerge in this period. He opened Golden Rule Park, a public park and playground next to the Acme Sucker Rod Factory. Jones paid his workers a minimum of \$2 per day and gave a 5 percent bonus at Christmas time, well above the average wage of \$1 per day in the city. Jones efforts at reform extended outside of the factory walls. He gave numerous lectures and speeches, advocating specific reforms like the

16. Knudten, Richard D. *The Systematic Thought of Washington Gladden*. Humanities Press: New York, 1968. 135.

17. M. Jones, 108.

18. Handy, Robert T. *The Social Gospel in America 1870-1920*. Oxford University Press: New York, 1966. 6.

19. M. Jones, 67.

eight hour workday, and more general ideas like the Social Gospel. Jones's factory was extremely successful, and his personal fortune grew rapidly. This allowed him to pursue his cause in favor of the working class. His influence within Toledo grew, and within five years of settling in the city, he began to make his first real moves into politics.²⁰

Jones's entrance into politics was an accident caused by Toledo's factional politics. Before 1897, Ohio had been a swing state. The Governorship was regularly traded between the two parties, as was leadership in its major cities. By 1897, however, the Republican Party had gained a firmer grasp on the state.²¹ Both Senators were Republicans, as was the Governor. Additionally, Ohio Republican William McKinley was elected president in 1897. Toledo was less competitive than the rest of the state. Republicans had held a firm grasp on the mayor's office since 1884, and had controlled national elections in the county for even longer.²² Because of this, the major political battle of Jones's time was not between the two parties, but within one.

Two figures dominated the Republican Party, but surprisingly President McKinley was not one of them. They were Mark Hanna and Joseph Foraker, and they were engaged in "one of the most extraordinary factional fights offered by the history of American politics."²³ Mark Hanna was a U.S. Senator and an exceptionally wealthy businessman from Ohio. He was most well-known, however, for his role as McKinley's campaign manager, and as chairman of the Republican National Committee. His connection with McKinley made him one of the most important figures in the Republican Party.²⁴

20. M. Jones, 68-72, 104.

21. Lamis, Alexander, P. and Usher, Brian. *Ohio Politics: Revised and Updated Edition*. Kent State University Press: Kent, Ohio, 2007. 5.

22. Downes, Randolph C. *Industrial Beginnings*. The Historical Society of Northwest Ohio, 1954. 150.

23. Croly, Herbert, *Marcus Alonzo Hanna: His Life and Work*. The Macmillan Company: New York, 1923. 138.

24. M. Jones, 109.

Joseph Foraker was one of very few party members who could challenge Hanna's authority. Foraker was governor of Ohio from 1886 until 1890 and had a large following throughout his state.²⁵ Initially, the two were content to work together, but in 1888, they broke from each other in a feud that would change the political landscape of Ohio. The break stemmed from a disagreement over who would win his state's support for the presidential nomination. Hanna put his full support behind John Sherman, a practical choice, if not a particularly exciting one. Sherman was the best known and respected potential candidate, having served as a Senator for many years and as secretary of the treasury. Foraker had other plans, however. He believed that if he could aid James Blaine in securing the nomination, he would be selected as the vice presidential candidate. This was likely as the Democratic Party had selected an Ohioan as their nominee. Despite Hanna's predictions and support of Sherman, Benjamin Harrison won the nomination. Because of Foraker's support for Blaine, the relationship between the two deteriorated into a rather bitter rivalry. According to one Hanna biographer, "He could overlook almost any human failing, except disloyalty,"²⁶ and he felt that Foraker had betrayed him. The two continued to fight for control of the party into the early 20th century, which created the political landscape that would allow a virtual unknown like Sam Jones to win a major mayoral race.²⁷

Entering the municipal election in 1897, neither faction of the party held control. The previous mayor, Guy Major, supported Foraker, but enough Hanna men held positions to prevent one side from leading the city. Because of this, the lead up to the Republican Convention of 1897 was heavily complicated. Major, along with Charles Griffin, were the most prominent Foraker

25. Walters, Everett. *Joseph Benson Foraker: An Uncompromising Republican*. The Ohio History Press: Columbus, Ohio. 1948 36.

26. Croly, 137-8.

27. Croly, 130-9.

men.²⁸ Various candidates for mayor were put forward, with different degrees of support. The Hanna machine threw its support behind James Melvin, an elderly businessman. Interestingly, despite his history as a Foraker supporter, Major favored Melvin as well. Some businessmen and Jim Ashley, an important figure in the Hanna machine, supported John Craig. The support of the Foraker machine was similarly divided. Some supported Lem Harris, a city clerk under Mayor Major. Though Jones's reputation with laborers gained him some support, he went largely unnoticed by political insiders. Going into the convention it was unclear who would be the victor.²⁹

When the convention met on February 25, virtually no one predicted that by the end of the day, Sam Jones would be the Republican nominee for mayor. On the first ballot, Melvin had a notable lead, although not enough to secure the nomination. He gained slowly on subsequent ballots, startling those who did not support him. As it became clear that he would win, certain delegates realized that they had to do something immediately if they wanted to thwart the Hanna machine. Delegate Harry King suggested to William Fellows, a Harris manager, that perhaps Jones would be a suitable compromise. Fellows accepted, but insisted that King talk to Jim Ashley before going through with the plan. Ashley agreed and announced his change of support to the convention. After this, the vote swung dramatically in Jones's favor, and he was selected as the nominee for mayor. The turn of events was stunning, and few imagined the consequences of the nomination on the future of Toledo politics.³⁰

Jones had a natural talent for campaigning. He used his skill as an orator and instantly connected to audiences. Jones had the support of most of the Republican Party. His advocacy of municipal ownership of utilities and against political parties did frighten some of the party's

28. *Toledo Bee* [Toledo] 22/2/1897:4. Microfilm.

29. M. Jones, 109-110.

30. *Toledo Bee* [Toledo] 26/2/1897:1. Microfilm.

leaders, but overall they felt as a businessman he would protect business interests. The mayoral vote was extremely close, most likely due to working class fears that he would favor business and some lost support from Republicans who feared his radical ideas. Additionally, Jones undoubtedly lost support from the working class because the *Bee* portrayed him as a dry candidate. Jones received a lower percentage of the vote in working and ethnic neighborhoods, and it seems that they simply did not believe that he could abandon those who had nominated him. Toledo's ethnic populations also feared his stance on liquor laws, which was played up by the *Bee*.³¹ Jones defeated Democratic candidate Parks Hone by only a few hundred votes. All but one other Republican candidate in the municipal election won by a greater margin. Nevertheless, Sam Jones was able to rise from a virtual unknown to mayor of the city of Toledo in just a few months.³²

The First Term

Jones spent most of his first term learning how to function as mayor and had few major successes. He advocated for grand reforms, such as the eight hour workday and public ownership of utilities. He focused on the creation of a city lighting plant, and also advocated for a municipally-operated traction company.³³ At the time of his election, Jones did not have a real plan for implementing these reforms. He spoke to the people about municipal ownership, but at this point he was not knowledgeable enough to go after the lighting plant or natural gas in any meaningful way. Despite his wishes the city council continued to renew the lighting contracts and got rid of the city's failing municipal gas company, opting instead for a private contract. The city's gas company had existed since 1891 and had been successful at first. Later in the decade, however, mismanagement had caused inefficiency, and the plant was running out of gas reserves.

31. DeMatteo, 95-6.

32. M. Jones, 114-8.

33. DeMatteo, 100.

The city council anticipated the plant's shutdown and readied a new private contract.³⁴ Yet, Jones frequently claimed that he would strive to bring these utilities under municipal ownership, leading those who had voted for him to believe that he would. Perhaps aware that he did not have a supportive cast in the city government, or perhaps simply unsure of how to propose such a change, Jones did not put forward many large reforms on this subject.

Jones faced similar problems concerning the issue of the eight-hour day. He had campaigned with the idea of instituting the eight-hour day as a city-wide standard, but he wasn't able to put forward a strong effort towards this either. He had instituted the eight-hour day in his own factory and felt that it would increase employment if used everywhere.³⁵ He had successfully put it into effect for city workers, which he had the power to do. He was unable, however, to make an effective law governing city-wide employers. He wanted to put this into effect in Toledo, but again, he did not have the power to do so.

Jones was able to begin a few reforms. He managed to institute the eight-hour workday for all city workers. He secured more humane treatment for accused criminals by removing police officers' heavy clubs. He closed down some gambling spots, but generally did not put much effort into enforcing saloon laws. The laws relating to the police were successful because Jones did not have to go through city council to achieve them, as the mayor was in charge of the police department. Enforcing gambling laws was easy to achieve because the Republican city council agreed on the issue. These smaller reforms, unlike his grander ideas, did not require any fighting with the city council and were successful because of this.³⁶

Despite his efforts to put these reforms into effect, Jones found the system difficult to navigate and allies hard to come by. The reforms certainly seemed plausible at the time. Jones's

34. DeMatteo, 99.

35. M. Jones, 100-2.

36. DeMatteo, 101.

idol, Hazen Pingree, had recently succeeded in bringing city lighting under municipal ownership. Detroit constructed a municipal lighting plant in 1895, and by the time Jones was in office, the change had been proven to save the city money.³⁷ Pingree and Detroit were different than Jones and Toledo, however. Pingree maintained his membership in the Republican Party. Although he certainly alienated many prominent members with his reform agenda, he was still a member of the party and thus still had some support among the city council. Additionally, Detroit's city council was smaller and more efficient than Toledo's. Thus, Pingree had an easier road for legislation and a more supportive cast.³⁸

Jones's political alienation and Toledo's complicated city charter made it near impossible for Jones to accomplish anything extensive. The city had a forty-five member city council, elected by wards. Each ward elected one member of the board of aldermen and two to the board of council. Additionally, the city had fourteen boards and commissions that were autonomous. This system left the mayor with little power, and distributed it so broadly that efficient reform of any magnitude was nearly impossible.³⁹ The other problem for Jones was that he had begun to alienate some prominent members of the Republican Party. His more radical remarks had startled the pro-business members of the party, and they weren't willing to work towards reforms like municipal ownership and reduced workdays. Another problem was Jones's own distaste for the party system. Jones first indicated that he was opposed to the party system during his campaign. He gave a few speeches on the subject in which he argued that parties were not necessary in municipal politics. He argued that the voters' decision should be based on the candidates' qualifications and that their party should be irrelevant. As his political career continued, his

37. Holli, Melvin G. *Reform in Detroit: Hazen S. Pingree and Urban Politics*. Oxford University Press: New York, 1969. 83-4.

38. M. Jones, 107.

39. M. Jones, 106.

stance against parties hardened.⁴⁰ By the election of 1899 there was a notable rift between Jones and other Republican leaders. But during his first term, the rift was not so great as to make renomination impossible. While Jones had failed to accomplish the big things he had advocated, his first term was relatively successful. His minor reforms were popular, and given the Republican Party's record of success in Toledo, another victory seemed likely if the Party were to renominate Jones.

The 1899 Primary

Unfortunately, the party's nomination convention was corrupt and Jones knew it. Before the Republican Convention of 1899, Jones sent a letter to Chairman T.P. Brown stating his intentions. If the party were to use the straight Baber Law and Jones lost, he would accept the decision and would bow out. However, if the party refused and instead used the modified Baber Law, Jones would not accept its decision.⁴¹ The Baber Law was passed in 1871 and allowed a party to hold a direct primary. The modified Baber Law, which had been used by the party since 1895, allowed voters to elect delegates to the nominating convention. This method had been proven to be corrupt. The city board of elections proved that in 1895, several pro-Guy Major delegates had not actually won majorities in their wards. While Jones's ultimatum may seem like a gamble, in reality it was not.⁴² Jones knew that his popularity was strong enough to win him the nomination if the people were allowed to vote. Brown knew this as well and refused Jones's proposal for the open primary. The party selected a committee of five to oversee the convention, men whom Jones claimed were known to oppose him.⁴³ The convention began on March 4, and Jones arrived to find that people who wanted to see the action were denied entry. The crowd

40. M. Jones, 114-15.

41. S. Jones, 87.

42. M. Jones, 259.

43. S. Jones, 88.

grew large and unruly and physically forced its way through the doors. After the mob gained access to the convention, the candidates spoke.⁴⁴ The most important thing to note is that Jones refused to give a straight answer to the question of whether he would support the Republican ticket if he were to lose. The intent of this question was certainly to bring into the open his desire to run as a third party candidate. The first two ballots were split nearly evenly between Jones and Charles Russell, a notable real estate dealer. On the third ballot Russell reached the required one hundred and thirty votes and was officially the Republican candidate for mayor.⁴⁵

The Republican Party did not renominate Jones: they feared his reformist ideas and important party leaders made it clear that they questioned his place in the Republican Party. In a letter to Jones just after the convention, Chairman Brown blamed Jones's loss directly on his lack of party loyalty. He wrote that he was "convinced that the party never had (Jones's) loyal support," and that this was the reason for which the delegates did not vote in Jones's favor.⁴⁶ Jim Ashley, a man who had been important in nominating Jones in 1897, also detailed his concerns in a letter. Like Brown, he had no confidence in Jones's loyalty to the party. Moreover, he believed that Jones was more similar to William Jennings Bryan than he was to William McKinley. Additionally, he blamed Jones's loss on his strange doctrines, saying that he would be "ready to do (his) part to defeat (Jones) because of (his) doctrines of socialism and anarchy."⁴⁷ Party leaders knew that they could not trust Jones to fight for their interests and because of this they went against tradition and refused to renominate Jones.

Party leaders had a point. When Mark Hanna ran for U.S. Senate in 1897, Jones refused to give a straight answer to those who questioned his intent to support Hanna. He avoided the

44. *Toledo Blade* [Toledo] 4/3/1899:1. Microfilm.

45. M. Jones, 150.

46. *Toledo Blade* [Toledo] 8/3/1899:1. Microfilm.

47. *Toledo Bee* [Toledo] 11/3/1899:3. Microfilm.

question so thoroughly that one writer for the Bee wrote, “If some one will kindly hand Mr. Jones a pneumatic saddle, he will find the wear and tear of sitting on the fence less painful.”⁴⁸ When George Waldorf, a prominent Hanna man, asked Jones for his stance, he said that he could not endorse Hanna but did not come out against him either.⁴⁹ A straightforward statement of Jones’s stance on the issue did not appear until October 27, when William H. Tucker, a notable Republican and staunch Hanna man, asked Jones about his intentions. Jones replied that he would “not vote for or support the republican legislative or senatorial ticket. I am not for Mark Hanna.”⁵⁰ Factionalism still existed in the Republican Party, but defeating Jones was more important. His refusal to support the party caused great concern among its leaders and played a large role in the convention in 1899.

The 1899 Election

Immediately after the convention, Jones announced his independent candidacy. This set the stage for an interesting three-candidate race. Jones’s popularity made victory possible despite the fact that he was independent. The Democrats hoped to benefit from a split in the Republican Party that might allow them to win with only a plurality. And for the Republicans, recent dominance in Toledo gave hope. Jones’s Republican opponent was the aforementioned Charles Russell. Much younger than Jones, Russell was serving as a member of the board of education at the time of his nomination. He was described as a clean-cut businessman and had no real political experience outside of his current minor role. He had the support of the Hanna machine and was a staunch party supporter.⁵¹ Rather than the reforms that Jones espoused, Russell’s main

48. *Toledo Bee* [Toledo] 24/10/1897:4. Microfilm.

49. *Toledo Bee* [Toledo] 11/10/1897:2. Microfilm.

50. *Toledo Bee* [Toledo] 27/10/1897:2. Microfilm.

51. M. Jones, 147.

concern was lowering the high tax rate in Toledo.⁵² Russell was quite popular with those who knew him, and his Hanna affiliation made him a formidable foe.

Jones's Democratic opponent was Captain Patrick H. Dowling, a prominent figure within the party. The Democrats selected him at their convention on February 25 with near unanimous approval. The party also used delegates instead of an open primary. Dowling had the support of Negley Cochran, the editor of Toledo's second major newspaper, *The Toledo Bee*. The *Bee* said about the Democratic Convention that, in stark contrast to its Republican counterpart, "a more harmonious convention was never held."⁵³ There is, however, some evidence that suggests that Dowling was not interested in running for mayor. A few weeks before the convention, he stated that he did not want his name used for the nomination. Additionally, he was out of town when the convention took place.⁵⁴ He was not particularly active in campaigning and his platform is difficult to find. Though the Democrats had fared poorly in Toledo elections as of late, the unity of their party compared to the fragmentation of the Republican Party gave hope that Dowling had a chance in the upcoming election.

The election centered around three major issues. These were party corruption, administrative reform, and temperance. Party corruption was evident in Toledo and the fact that Jones was not renominated solidified the concern. The aforementioned problem with Major's delegates, as well as other corruption which will be discussed later startled people. Major had been known to profit from gambling and prostitution, and his corruption was so bad that the *Blade* had refused to nominate him.⁵⁵ This created a lasting stain on the party which would tarnish Russell. The candidates also differed in their feelings on reform. Jones had grand plans to

52. *Toledo Blade* [Toledo] 23/2/1899:1. Microfilm.

53. *Toledo Bee* [Toledo] 25/2/1899:1. Microfilm.

54. Ford, Harvey S. *The Life and Times of Golden Rule Jones*. University of Michigan, 1953. 300.

55. M. Jones, 108.

reform city government, most notably by bringing utilities under municipal control. Finally, there was a battle raging over the enforcement of Toledo's liquor laws, pitting its more religious residents against a large ethnic population. Each of these issues was widely reported in the news, and each contributed to the outcome of the election.

Party Corruption

Party corruption was a national issue in the late nineteenth century. Public offices in large cities were viewed as highly valuable positions. The contracts that cities entered into with companies for services such as construction or utilities were extremely valuable. Those in office had control over which companies were awarded these contracts, thus businesses had a stake in getting a favorable candidate elected. Politicians could receive support, financially or otherwise, in exchange for these contracts. Bribery of voters and public officials was not unheard of either. These issues were more important than ever, as more and more money entered politics. Corruption was worse than ever under Major, who was bolder and more opportunistic than previous mayors in his willingness to cheat the system. Thus, at the time of the 1899 election, cries of corruption were louder and more frequent than they had ever been.⁵⁶

In the 1890's Toledoans were well aware of party corruption in the nation as well as in their own city. Boss Tweed of New York presented a terrifying example to Toledoans. Additionally, the exposure of the Tammany Hall by C.H. Parkhurst and Clarence Lexow frightened the city's residents. According to Toledo historian Randolph Downes, "The revelations of rottenness in other cities were luridly published in the Toledo press...The sickening exposures of city corruption in the 1890's...were fully known to Toledo and Lucas

56. Ware, Alan. *The American Direct Primary: Party Institutionalization and Transformation in the North*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2002. 70-73.

County readers.”⁵⁷ Even before the city had any significant examples of corruption, the people of Toledo created good government movements. Citizens feared that their city could have the same corruption problems they read about in cities like New York and their fears would be confirmed early in the decade.

Toledo’s political parties were undoubtedly involved in corrupt activity. They made little effort to cover up their illicit activities and all that a citizen had to do to discover them was read the newspaper. The biggest scandal was uncovered in 1892. “Six city council members were convicted of soliciting and receiving bribes of various companies for passing city ordinances favorable to the companies.”⁵⁸ Three of the men were Republicans and three were Democrats. The outrage was furthered when the men were fined a mere \$250. Shaken, the reform minded residents of Toledo began to seek out more corruption. Beginning in 1894, a new accountant went through Toledo’s city departments in search of corruption. He found numerous examples, including over \$5,000 in illegal fees received by the police clerk. The corruption was so bad that in 1895 the *Blade* refused to endorse Guy Major, even though he was the Republican nominee. Citizens rushed to form reform organizations in an effort to fight this corruption. When it was discovered that several pro-Major delegates had not actually received majorities, Toledoans grew even angrier.⁵⁹

Even after Major left office, corruption continued to exist in the city government. In early February of 1899, the *Bee* reported on a suspicious grant for a railway. The right to build the Water Street railway was granted to Albert Backus by a committee controlled by Thomas Wheeler, a major figure in the Republican Party. According to the *Bee*, the city received nothing in return for granting the right to build this railway, which it valued at several hundred thousand

57. Downes, 150.

58. Downes, 154.

59. Downes, 154-7.

dollars. Although the story did not directly imply that Wheeler received something in the deal, it seems likely.⁶⁰ A blatant indication of corruption in the party was that Walter Brown, the party's leader, was also the attorney for the street car company that controlled the city franchise. Clearly there was some conflict of interests in play.⁶¹ As was the trend nationwide, Toledoans were becoming suspicious of parties.

The Republican Party's nomination of Russell made it even clearer that the party was not in line with what people wanted. Jones publicly requested an open primary in which the voice of the people would be heard. The party publicly refused, instead opting for a closed convention. This in itself would have provoked a great deal of skepticism as it would indicate to some that the party feared that its interests would not be served if the people got what they wanted. This suspicion was increased when the events of the convention were reported. Jones and his closest supporters claimed that votes against him had been openly purchased on the convention floor.⁶² Although this suspicion was never pursued, it cast even more doubt over the trustworthiness of party leaders. Going into the election, this issue was widely reported, and, as will be shown later, certainly played a role in voters' decisions.

On this issue, the difference between the candidates was obvious. Jones represented an independent movement, and a break from the established parties. The other candidates represented party control. Russell had been chosen for his loyalty to the party and it seemed that its leaders believed he would do what they wanted. His election would mean a continuation of Republican control, and that little would be done about the corruption within the party. Dowling, the Democrat, was much the same. Though the Democratic Party did not receive nearly as much attention as its Republican counterpart on the subject of corruption, Dowling still represented

60. *Toledo Bee* [Toledo] 4/2/1899:1. Microfilm.

61. Johnson, Wendell F. *Toledo's Non-Partisan Movement*. Press of The H.J. Chittenden Co.: Toledo, 1922. 17.

62. S. Jones, 90.

control by a party. Most likely though, his loss was not because he was a party man, but simply because the Democratic Party could not muster much support in Toledo at the time. Jones on the other hand was rejected by the party because he refused to do its bidding. He was openly critical of political parties and thought they should be abolished. If Toledoans were wary of parties, they could not have asked for a better candidate.

Municipal Reform

Municipal reform was a closely linked issue. Jones had major reform aspirations and they grew more extreme the longer he remained in office. He sought to put into effect the eight-hour workday for municipal employees, and most importantly, to gain public ownership of utilities. His inspiration came largely from Hazen Pingree, the Detroit mayor who served in the 1890s. Pingree succeeded in reforming the city's utilities and successfully created a municipal lighting plant. He reduced the price of natural gas from \$1.50 per thousand feet to eighty cents and he was nearly able to secure a three cent fair for streetcars in Detroit. What most inspired Jones was his battle for municipal lighting. Pingree showed that the current lighting contract was costing the city far too much money for poor service. He argued for municipal ownership of a lighting plant, and struggled against the powerful corporation that owned the contract at the time. Pingree had to go to great lengths to win over the city council, showing numerous examples of cities with cheap lighting and even exposing a bribe. Eventually, he was successful in his efforts to bring lighting under municipal control. Dealing with the gas company, Pingree used threats to win his way. He discovered that the gas company's contract had expired twenty years earlier and that it had been overcharging people. In fear of repercussions, the company lowered its rates. He proved that reform of this sort was possible in the city.⁶³

63. Holli, 75-84, 94, 120.

Throughout his career, Jones tried to mimic Pingree's reform efforts. The two exchanged letters frequently, and Jones admired him greatly. Jones's battle over utilities focused on city lighting.⁶⁴ Jones believed that the city was being charged far too much, and felt that a new contract could greatly reduce costs. This situation in Toledo was different than Detroit, however. Pingree did not have to deal with the massive hostile city council that Jones did. Though it was not always supportive of Pingree's reforms, Detroit's city council was willing to work with him. Also, he had clear threats to use against the current franchises. Pingree had evidence that the gas company was acting illegally.⁶⁵ Jones had no such thing. Thus, Jones's battle for reform in utilities was to be much more difficult.

The *Toledo Blade*, the city's major Republican newspaper, used Jones's support of public ownership of utilities to go on the offensive. The focus of the *Blade's* concern was that public ownership would raise taxes. Toledo had an abnormally high tax rate at the time and the *Blade* played up this fact as much as it could. According to Marnie Jones, a heavy city deficit caused by supporting numerous paupers and corruption in the administration was the reason. Major's machine had purchased votes and technological advances such as electrification of street railways and laying natural gas pipelines allowed for new opportunities to sell franchises. These were granted generously, costing the city a great deal of extra money.⁶⁶ One cartoon just before the election depicted a taxpayer with large bags labeled after Jones initiatives weighing him down. The cartoon is displayed below.⁶⁷ Jones's plan for the shift to municipal control of lighting was to hire a construction company to build a lighting plant. The city would run this company and power the city's street lighting at a cheaper rate than was currently used. The city


64. *Toledo Blade* [Toledo] 18/3/1899:1. Microfilm.

65. Holli, 81, 91.

66. M. Jones, 107.

67. *Toledo Blade* [Toledo] 9/3/1899:1. Microfilm.

would then pay off the construction company with the savings. Using figures from Detroit's municipal lighting plant, *The Blade* reported that it would take 45 years to pay for the plant with Toledo's savings.⁶⁸ It is impossible to know if this estimate was accurate, but the *Blade* did everything it could to convince people that public utilities were not in their favor.



On this issue, too, Jones differed greatly from his opponents. He was the biggest reformer of the group. He alone advocated municipal ownership, and if the people wanted reform, he was the obvious choice. Russell did not support these reforms. His position was articulated by the *Blade*, which represented Republican interests. Dowling's position is difficult to find. It is likely

68. *Toledo Blade* [Toledo] 18/3/1899:1. Microfilm.

that while due to his association with the Democratic Party he was not as against reform as Russell, he still was not advocating anything like Jones. Voters knew clearly who to vote for on this issue if they cared about it.

Temperance

The third major issue was perhaps the most sensational of them all. This was the growing temperance movement nationwide and in Toledo. The temperance movement sought to prohibit the manufacture, sale, and consumption of alcoholic beverages. Throughout the 19th century the movement gained strength throughout the country. Groups such as the Ohio Anti-Saloon League were gaining members and influence. Toledo, a city known for its high density of saloons and other houses of vice had many prominent citizens who favored the temperance movement. The issue would inspire a great deal of drama during the election.⁶⁹

Jones's opponents used his platform on the liquor issue to attack his character. Jones refused to enforce laws dictating when liquor could be sold, much to the chagrin of the growing number of temperance supporters in Toledo. Jones expressed his lack of concern with vice when he stated, "I have more respect for many saloon keepers to-day than I have for a great many so-called good citizens in the church and out of it, who are devoting their energies from infancy to old age, to the mere matter of getting money."⁷⁰ Indeed Jones worked according to this belief during his first term. The first challenge he faced as mayor arrived when chief of police Ben Raitz was accused of drunkenness while on duty. Numerous witnesses recalled seeing Raitz drinking in many saloons, sometimes after midnight, at which time it became illegal for a saloon to be open. Many called for Jones to dismiss Raitz, but Jones refused, saying that while he did not approve, he did not think the offense worthy of dismissal. This instance showed people that

69. M. Jones, 4-5.

70. Jones, Samuel M. Letter to Rev. M. Crafts. 28 Oct., 1897. *Samuel Milton Jones Papers, 1896-1904*. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio Historical Society, 1976. Microfilm.

Jones was not interested in policing vice in Toledo, which would lead to much criticism from the wealthier class.⁷¹

The issue was made even more sensational when the noted evangelist Sam Jones, who coincidentally shared a name with the mayor, arrived in Toledo. Jones went on a speaking tour of Toledo, where he denounced the saloons and the mayor's support for them.⁷² His words were extremely harsh as he sought to build up sentiment against the mayor. He claimed that "if the devil were the mayor he would not change a single thing."⁷³ Jones's speeches were widely attended, the *Blade* claiming that over 5,000 attended his final speech. His remarks against the mayor were thus widely known, and their dramatic delivery was certain to have stirred up a notable response.⁷⁴ The city's religious leaders followed this example and denounced the mayor in their own congregations. It seemed that one could scarcely read a newspaper without hearing of a new anti-saloon rally. Tensions relating to liquor ran high as the election approached.

Jones's position against enforcing morality laws was well known by the people. The actions of his first term had shown it, and he himself acknowledged it. Russell on the other hand announced his desire to suppress saloons and gamblers in the *Blade*.⁷⁵ He sought to appeal to the vocal anti-saloon group with strict enforcement of morality laws. Dowling's position on saloons is difficult to determine, but given the fact that he was already unlikely to win, he would have been overshadowed by either Russell or Jones regardless of which side he chose. Of the majority of Toledoans who favored the Republican Party, those who did not want to see a crack-down on saloons had only one choice.

71. Ford, 152-9.

72. *Toledo Bee* [Toledo] 23/3/1899:4. Microfilm.

73. *Toledo Blade* [Toledo] 12/2/1899:3. Microfilm.

74. *Toledo Blade* [Toledo] 23/3/1899:5. Microfilm.

75. *Toledo Blade* [Toledo] 13/3/1899:1. Microfilm.

On election day, the people made it clear who they supported. Jones received more than twice as many votes as Russell and Dowling combined. It is not shocking that Dowling was defeated so soundly. He received far fewer votes than the Democrats had in previous elections, which was to be expected given Jones's appeal. Traditionally, the Democratic vote came from the city's ethnic working-class wards. In 1897, these people feared Jones due to his business background and perceived connection to temperance, but by 1899 he had won them over. The fact that Russell was so far behind could not have been predicted. His nomination by the Republican Party alone could have been expected to carry at least a reasonable number of votes. He was no match for Jones's popularity, however, as the results show. The vast majority of Toledoans favored Jones. Even though he had failed to achieve much in the way of reform during his first term, the people were still attracted to him. It is clear that they agreed with him on certain issues, but a further examination is required to understand which ones.⁷⁶

The Results and Meaning of the 1899 Election

Jones made little impact on the city council vote. One Democrat won a seat on the board of aldermen that had been Republican, but there were no candidates who sought to ride Jones's coattails. The vote remained for the most part along party lines.⁷⁷ It seems that the voters simply did not have an alternative that would have been more favorable to Jones. Additionally, the party machines were still strong at the ward level, which ensured victory for party candidates. Further evidence that there was no alternative can be found in the fact that approximately seven thousand voters voted for Jones and no one else on the entire ballot.⁷⁸ This implies that a huge number of voters had lost faith in the rest of the city government and felt Jones was the only person worth voting for. If there had been council candidates in Jones's likeness, some of these people would

76. DeMatteo, 105-8.

77. *Toledo Blade* [Toledo] 4/4/1899:1. Microfilm.

78. M. Jones, 155.

likely have voted for them. Even without a party of followers, Jones was still a dominant victor. Examination of trends in voting and people's reaction to the issues makes it possible to understand why.

Reliable public opinion polling did not exist at this time, so reconstruction of voter motivation must be based on newspaper articles, close inspection of trends in election results, and other infrequent displays of opinion. In the case of Toledo's 1899 municipal election, indications of public opinion are made especially difficult because of the partisan nature of city's newspapers. Contemporary reporting on the general feeling of the public is blatantly unreliable. The *Blade*, for instance, reported that the majority of people were no longer supportive of Jones and that Russell would win easily.⁷⁹ For this reason, articles summarizing public sentiment must be avoided. Fortunately, some articles did feature specific displays of support. These are far more useful in discussion of opinion during the election.

On the first major issue, it is possible to determine that the citizens of Toledo were interested in fighting the established parties. This was evident from the behavior of the crowd at the Republican convention. When Jones arrived, a large crowd, mostly his supporters, had been locked out of the convention. In previous elections, the convention had always been open to the public, but, most likely fearing the wrath of the people if Jones was not renominated, party leaders decided keep it closed. With the help of Jones, however, the people managed to gain entrance, and from that point on, a disorderly convention was assured. As soon as Walter Brown took to the podium to speak, the booing began, and did not stop throughout the convention. The people in attendance were vocal in support of Jones, and because of this, the 1899 convention was much more hostile than those previous.⁸⁰ The people seem to have been distrustful of the

79. *Toledo Blade* [Toledo] 3/4/1899:1. Microfilm.

80. *Toledo Blade* [Toledo] 4/3/1899:1. Microfilm.

party. It had been well reported that Jones's request for an open primary had been denied, which would have cast doubt over the legitimacy of the convention. Indeed the people arrived, ready to express their dissatisfaction with Brown and the party, and their refusal to abide by the decision to close the primary showed their contempt for it. This event most clearly signaled that the citizens of Toledo had grown wary of party control.⁸¹

Also important to note on this issue is that after the end of Jones's run as mayor, the independent movement continued. For twenty years after Jones was elected in 1899, independent mayors were victorious in Toledo. The people had become so fed up with the corruption within the parties that they refused to let them run the city for this long stretch of time. It was dissatisfaction with parties that best explained the phenomenon. Jones's successor, Brand Whitlock, had the same dynamic personality and was more successful as a reformer than Jones. Because of this, one may assume that it was not the independence but the persona that made these candidates attractive to voters. This is not the case, however, as Whitlock's final term as mayor ended in 1913, and the next four elections would continue independent rule without a charismatic leader like Jones or Whitlock. The fact that independents were able to win elections for so long also counteracts a potential factor explaining Jones's victory. It seems unlikely that he was elected so easily simply because of his popular personality. This would not explain future victories by independents, and it enforces the idea that issues were more important to the public than personalities in 1899. This independent movement, along with people's actions at the convention show negative sentiment towards the established party.⁸²

Support for Jones's reform efforts can also be inferred from the newspapers. Crowds reacted enthusiastically to his reform ideas during campaign speeches. While this does indicate

81. M. Jones, 148.

82. Johnson, 9-10.

that some viewed this issue favorably, it is impossible to determine public opinion from the generally very biased campaign speech audience. Editorials in the papers, however, give a more reliable account of whether or not people favored Jones's position. One editorial in the *Bee* discussed municipal ownership of utilities. Author Henry T. Niles claimed that "all intelligent people believe in the necessity of municipal reform," and that nearly all believe in public utilities. He cited the growth of publicly owned utilities in Europe as evidence.⁸³ Another editorial in the *Bee* discussed the presence of the other Sam Jones. This writer applauded Jones for attacking the correct vice, that of greed and corruption.⁸⁴ Editorials like these showed that at least some people favored Jones because of his reform agenda. They focused mostly on his attack on utilities. They do not, however, provide evidence that a notable percentage of people favored Jones's reform cause. For this, it is necessary to examine endorsements.

The most persuasive endorsement that suggested that many people agreed with Jones on reform is that of the city's labor unions. It can be assumed that the unions would support a candidate because he promised reform that would favor workers. In 1897, the unions did not endorse Jones. Generally, the Democratic Party received support from ethnic laborers and unions. The vote, as in 1897, was often split closely in these parts of the city. By 1899, however, Jones had gained union support, notably with his efforts in favor of the eight hour workday, a common goal for workers at the time.⁸⁵ These endorsements encompassed a large portion of the population, as Toledo had a large number of workers employed in fields where union membership was common. Those involved in manufacturing and railway work as well as other

83. *Toledo Bee* [Toledo] 8/3/1899:4. Microfilm.

84. *Toledo Bee* [Toledo] 13/3/1899:4. Microfilm.

85. *Toledo Bee* [Toledo] 10/3/1899:1. Microfilm.

unskilled workers, were organized by the Knights of Labor.⁸⁶ This shows more clearly than do editorials that a large group of people favored Jones for his reform plans.

As with the issue of reform, public sentiment on the temperance issue is best determined by looking at endorsements. According to the papers, there was no doubt that Jones was assured the vote of the city's saloon keepers. Despite the fact that they had not supported him two years prior, he gained their favor by refusing to enforce Toledo's blue laws. According to the *Bee*, Jones also won the support of the city's German population. The issue of personal liberty seems to have been important to this group, and during this election the right to purchase alcohol and visit saloons at any time was the personal liberty that was most threatened. As of the 1900 census, Toledo had approximately 12,000 German residents out of a total population of just over 130,000, so this was no small constituency.⁸⁷ Support gained from the temperance issue did not seem to be limited to Germans, however. According to the *Bee*, "There are many voters in Toledo who believe in personal liberty and do not want what they call puritanical laws enforced." The way the *Bee* worded it, it seems that Germans were only a part of a very large group of people who favored Jones's position on temperance. Judging from these facts, it seems that the temperance issue won Jones a large number of supporters.⁸⁸

86. Downes, 134.

87. Bartha, Stephen J. *A History of Immigrant Groups in Toledo*. The Ohio State University: Columbus, 1945. 8.

88. *Toledo Bee* [Toledo] 10/3/1899:1. Microfilm.

Ward by Ward Examination

Election Results By Ward ⁸⁹				
	Jones	Russell	Dowling	Percent for Jones
Ward 15	1,162	149	75	83.8
Ward 12	1,368	117	187	81.8
Ward 14	1,378	208	139	79.9
Ward 2	1,509	178	221	79.1
Ward 1	1,093	238	134	74.6
Ward 8	1,699	367	211	74.6
Ward 5	1,147	339	155	69.9
Ward 6	1,117	367	135	69.0
Ward 13	992	171	300	67.8
Ward 4	932	221	235	67.1
Ward 3	666	185	170	65.2
Ward 11	798	302	267	58.4
Ward 10	1,022	529	221	57.7
Ward 9	1,036	444	370	56.0
Ward 7	835	451	319	52.0

An examination of the results in the individual wards of the city can be helpful in determining who voted most strongly for Jones.⁹⁰ The two wards that were most strongly for Jones were the fifteenth and twelfth. The fifteenth ward was located at the southwest corner of the city.⁹¹ Sixty eight percent of the residents were first or second generation immigrants, mostly Polish.⁹² It was one of the city's most ethnic, and thereby working-class wards. The twelfth ward was located just southwest of the city's center. It was a poor ward, as many of its residents were listed as boarders. Seventy six percent of the residents were first or second generation immigrants, mostly German and Irish. Almost all were employed in working-class occupations. Dowling was able to attract many more votes than Russell most likely because German and Irish immigrants were hostile to Russell and his puritanical stance on liquor.

89. *Toledo Blade* [Toledo] 4/4/1899:1. Microfilm. All following election result numbers are taken from this article.

90. Ward composition was determined by examining the census records and noting trends in ethnicity and occupation. Specific figures and details are given when available.

91. R.L. Polk & Co. Map of the City of Toledo, Lucas County, Ohio, 1895. By J.B. Marston, C.F. All following ward locations were determined using this map.

92. DeMatteo, 96. All following ethnicity statistics were taken from this work.

Wards fourteen and two were also extremely strong for Jones. The fourteenth ward was located at the south of the city, just west of the thirteenth. Jones's sucker rod company was located in this ward, which was primarily comprised of laborers. Sixty-six percent of the ward's residents were first or second generation immigrants. Certain parts of the ward had an extremely high density of German immigrants, which is reflected in the fact that Dowling had more votes Russell in a few precincts. Jones's victory was again dominant, though here it may be more related to Jones's personal connection to the ward. The second ward covered a very large area in the north of the city. It housed a wide variety of residents. Some of the precincts were heavily native-born with occupations that would have put them just above working class. Other precincts were heavily immigrant and seemed to be poorer. These precincts were so thoroughly foreign born that the second ward was the most ethnic in Toledo, with seventy nine percent of the residents being first- or second-generation immigrants. Looking at the results, however, would have betrayed none of this diversity, as Jones dominated each precinct. Again, Dowling defeated Russell in this ward. There were no significant differences in the results between the different areas of the ward.

Wards one and eight were the final two in which Jones won at least seventy percent of the vote. The first ward covered a large area in the northwest. Interestingly, despite the fact that Dowling resided in this ward, the result did not favor him. Jones won thoroughly in all four precincts in the ward. This was primarily a middle-class ward whose residents were neither poor nor particularly well off. Dowling's residence within the ward indicates that there were some wealthier residents, but his failure to gain any momentum suggests that they were neither common nor influential. The ward also had a notable, though not staggering number of first or second generation immigrants. The eighth ward was located to the southwest of the city's center.

Its composition was average for the city. Some of its precincts had a majority of first and second generation immigrants, while others had a majority of native residents. The residents of the ethnic precincts were primarily working class, while the native precincts were more prosperous. These two sides balanced the ward into an average one, less ethnic and more prosperous than the major working-class wards, but more ethnic and less prosperous than the upper-class wards.

In wards five and six, Jones still won over two thirds of the vote. The fifth ward was a large mass of land southeast of the Maumee River. The ward housed virtually all of the city's Hungarian immigrants and seems to have been one of the poorer wards. Many of the ward's residents listed themselves as day laborers in the census. Unlike the other ethnic wards, however, this ward did not support Dowling over Russell. Both were poor and heavily immigrant neighborhoods, but this ward had more Hungarian than German immigrants, which probably accounts for this difference. The sixth ward was located on the city's southern border. Its residents were a step above the working class in occupation. Very few of the residents were involved in manufacturing, and there were very few immigrants. This was not a wealthy neighborhood, but the census indicates that its residents enjoyed financial security.

Wards thirteen and four were still dominant victories for Jones. The thirteenth ward had essentially the same demographics as the twelfth. It was located just south of the twelfth and included a large prison. As in the twelfth, Dowling was able to defeat Russell. This makes sense again, because there were many German and Irish residents in the ward. The fourth ward was a small ward in the center of the city. The *Blade* described it as a ward full of saloons and cheap lodging.⁹³ Its population, with an extremely high concentration of immigrants, reflects this. Jones won easily, but more interestingly, this is one of very few wards in which Dowling outperformed Russell. The hostility of the voters towards Russell makes sense given the high immigrant

93. *Toledo Blade* [Toledo] 28/3/1899:1. Microfilm.

population. These people tended to be most strongly against enforcement of vice laws, and Russell was most strongly in favor of enforcing them. The fact that this ward was known to have many saloons supports this idea.

In wards three and eleven, Jones won less than two thirds of the vote. The third ward was a small one just northwest of the center of the city. One of the four precincts listed in the census contained a high density of German workers. The other three precincts were primarily native-born, or immigrants from England. Most of the residents of the ward were working class. The eleventh ward was a small one in the center of the city. The Blade referred to it as the gamblers' ward, and noted that there were many saloons operating within it.⁹⁴ This makes sense, as it was located next to the fourth ward, which had a similar reputation. Only forty one percent of the residents were immigrants, but those that were present were primarily Irish and German, which led to a Dowling victory in some of the precincts. Again, hostility towards saloon laws was visible in the election results.

Wards ten, nine, and seven were the least supportive of Jones. The seventh ward was a diverse one. Approximately half of its residents were immigrants or their children. It contained part of the West End, the wealthiest neighborhood in the city. Charles Griffin, one of Jones most prominent supporters, lived in this ward.⁹⁵ It also contained some working-class neighborhoods. Most notably, the seventh ward contained the only precinct in the entire city that Jones did not win. This is almost certainly due to the wealthy supporting Russell. Elsewhere in the ward there were enough working-class people to ensure a Jones victory, but this ward reinforces the belief that Jones had little support among the wealthy. The ninth ward, like the seventh, contained both the West End and working-class neighborhoods. Only forty eight percent of the residents were

94. *Toledo Blade* [Toledo] 16/2/1897:1. Microfilm.

95. *Toledo Blade* [Toledo] 4/4/1899:1. Microfilm.

first or second generation immigrants. The census lists many of the households having servants, a sign of wealth in the period. The results of the election fall in line with the ward's demographics. Four precincts were very close between Jones and Russell. The other two, both much larger than the first four, went overwhelmingly to Jones. Once again the working-class residents voted for Jones, while the wealthy were less willing to do so. The tenth ward also contained part of the West End. Only forty percent of the residents were first or second generation immigrants, making it the least ethnic in the city. Its results were similar to those of the ninth, in that some precincts were very close, while others were solidly for Jones.

Support for Jones clearly rested in the working class. His pro labor image and his reform-laden speeches no doubt dazzled working-class voters. Additionally, his refusal to enforce liquor laws certainly added to their appreciation of Jones. That his greatest victories came in working-class neighborhoods show that those who voted for him were most likely interested in his labor policies. They were not simply voting for the same party as they always had because they were invested in this candidate. They paid attention to what he said and supported his policies on the issues. Reform in labor would have been most important to many working-class people as it would have a great effect on them.

It is interesting to note that in the city's most ethnic wards, Dowling earned more votes than Russell. Democratic vote was usually strongest in the working-class wards which included numbers two, five, eight, twelve, thirteen, and fifteen. Thus it makes sense that these wards would continue to favor the Democrats over the Republicans. Dowling was the more labor-friendly of the two candidates and that certainly had an appeal. However, working-class wards such as the fifth, eighth, and fifteenth did not favor Dowling over Russell. The most notable difference in terms of voter demographics between these wards is that those that favored

Dowling over Russell had the most German and Irish residents. Those that did not were either primarily native born, or featured a large contingent of immigrants from another country such as Hungary. What this suggests is that liquor policy played an active role in voter decisions.

Germans and Irish were well known for their opposition to liquor control. Russell was the most staunchly in favor of enforcing these laws. Because voters in these German and Irish heavy wards were so much less interested in voting for Russell than their non-ethnic counterparts, it seems that many voters made their decision with liquor laws in mind.

Overall it seems that voters in Toledo were genuinely interested in the issues in this election, rather than simply voting along party lines or because of a personality. The idea that voters voted for Jones just because they liked his personality does not explain the lasting independent movement that took hold of Toledo after his death. This provides an answer to the question of what ordinary citizens thought of Progressive ideas. In Toledo, it seems that the majority of citizens favored an end to party corruption, reform that favored the working class, and disapproved of the temperance movement, commonly advocated by Progressive reformers. These feelings explain the popularity of Sam Jones, one of the most popular mayor's in Toledo's history, despite his lack of accomplishments. Jones's overwhelming victory, and the following reign of the independent movement, show that during the Progressive era, citizens were interested in urban reform and this interest had staying power.

This explanation of Jones's popularity has broad implications for the study of the Progressive era. The example of the 1899 election shows that the working class was more involved in the movement than accepted theories suggest. Progressive ideas and their support bases generally originated from the nation's middle class. Here, however, the middle class disliked Jones, and instead the working class overwhelmingly supported him. The example of

Jones, therefore, clearly supports the idea that the Progressive movement was a wide encompassing and inclusive movement. What made Jones different from the traditional model of middle-class progressivism was his stance on liquor. Others had advocated the same municipal reforms, but few combined that with lax control of liquor. Sam Jones managed to win over the city's ethnic working class with what seemed to be the perfect combination of stances. By offering reform favorable to the workers and avoiding morality laws that would upset them, Sam Jones offered a realistic, non-elitist version of Progressivism. By focusing only on reforms that the workers wanted, Jones made Progressivism a working-class movement, and provided a great example of how inclusive the reform movement could be.

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