Carl Stokes – Civil Rights 1960’s – Page 7

Hough: Building and Tension by Luke Ondish

From CWRU

http://www.case.edu/artsci/sixties/luke.html

Hough: Building and Tension
by Luke Ondish

Hough was annexed by the city of Cleveland in 1872. It is 2 square miles in area bounded by Euclid and Superior on its North and South sides and E 55th and E 105th on its West and East Sides. The summer of 1966 would see Hough in flames. Arson and looting were rampant, a martial law imposed by mobs walking the streets. Those that sought to escape the danger of the riots could count on no protection while policemen would seem to attack at random. The four day race riot would cost the city millions of dollars in damage and several lives. Though in 1950 Hough was still a predominately white middle class neighborhood, by 1960 the story was very different1. It used to be a fashionable neighborhood, known for its large single-family homes, wherein its residents lived comfortably. The streets were busy, but pleasantly so; it was not the overcrowded, deteriorated neighborhood that would eventually exploded into violence.

The neighborhood would become overcrowded. The community would become divided. Eventually, it would not be able to support itself, and it would break. The economic, political, and social, and geographic factors responsible for Hough’s decline, irritated by a lapsing post-war economy give rise to a cyclical dynamic taking the neighborhood on a downward spiral. The combination of deterioration and division in the community would irritate each other until Hough could take no more.

After the stock market crash of 1929, Cleveland was subject to the same destitution as other cities across the nation. Also like other cities, it rebounded in the war time economy of World War II. The city’s factories produced planes, tanks, artillery, bombs, binoculars, and telescopes for the war effort. The city enjoyed a stable industrial base as a producer of machine tools, electrical goods, and metal products. It had a large supply of trained workers, low-cost power and water, and was located within 500 miles of half the population of the United States.

Cleveland’s war time population swelled with ranks of Appalachian whites and southern blacks traveling to the city for work in the factories. Homes that once housed single families were made to accommodate several, beginning the pattern of overuse and overcrowding. The problem would worsen when the factories would close and returning servicemen would be eager to start families. Many families were forced to move where housing was cheapest2.

The once owner-occupied buildings in Hough were bought up by outsiders as the former owners passed away. Living away from the community, the new owners would have less incentive to fix them and make them more livable. The housing grew old and suffered a lack of maintenance. Many tenants could ill afford to move out of dilapidated housing. Often several families had to share converted single-family dwellings. These factors thus enacted a sort of skimming off the top of the economic ladder. Those that could afford to do so moved to better kept areas. With Hough’s population having less money, the tax based was significantly reduced. The area could not afford to shift its course, and by 1960 was in need of reform3.

Geographically, Hough was disadvantaged. Hough Street, the area’s main artery for traffic, was constantly congested. Lake shore traffic would find its way in along Crawford Avenue, which intersected Hough Street. Busy streets in themselves are not inherently bad for neighborhoods, but Hough ran right through the middle of the most concentrated residential districts. It is common that main arteries form boundaries. Cutting the districts in half like this greatly diminished the sense of unity felt by residents of the districts. This made communities much harder to mobilize for their common interests4.

With very little land left undeveloped, overcrowding in Hough’s residential buildings had little hope of relief by expansion. Industry was also impeded from growth because of this. When new space was required, industry had to settle where it could. Many small outcroppings of industry were scattered along and among residential districts. Such settlements would bring more traffic to neighborhoods, as well as noise, fumes, and dust. This contributed to the deterioration of living conditions5.

Hough has a favorable location within the city. It is twenty minutes by bus from the heart of Cleveland’s business and industrial district, ten minutes from what then was Western Reserve and Case Universities as well as surrounding museums, and fifteen minutes from Lake Erie. It was the organization and layout within the neighborhood that was problematic. Without and official local government, matters had to be seen to by local community leaders. With the diminished sense of community due to the splitting of the residential districts, motivation for projects was lacking6. Thus, the first cyclical dynamic is revealed.

Hough was also reflecting a need economically. Unemployment was high and 30% of heads of households were not employed. The rate of unskilled non-white heads of households was 16.7, while the rate for whites was 4.2. One third of the unemployed population was concentrated in the southeast corner7. Along with the fact that 60% of the residents in the northwest and southeast parts of Hough were white while the area from the southwest to northeast is over 60% non-white, there is evidence for further division in the community8. The different racial categories live apart from each other and in different economic conditions, the former reinforcing the alienation that can be felt from the latter.

The percentage of semi-skilled and unskilled workers in two tracts (L-3 and L-4) adjacent to each other out of the ten census tracts comprising Hough was 69.2. Tracts R-6 and R-9 had a rate of 51.8%. L-2 and L-4 have high rates of unemployment. These tracts are the most densely populated. This suggests a wide range of lifestyles within areas of concentrated population and groups of occupation types. This is a factor than can create dissonance in a community and make it harder to come together to realize goals.

The rate of self employed males in 1950 was five percent. By the late 50s, it had dropped to 1.5. This is evidence that the economy could not support as many businesses, and those that would otherwise start their own business were forced to work for a larger operation. This severity of this figure is greater when it is considered that the population during that time also grew by 10 percent. Even though the population grew, the economy was shrinking, stretching the financial resources of Hough very thin.

Not only did different races have large percents with different types of jobs, but large percents of each race’s constituents worked in different areas. Most of the working population of Hough worked on the East side of Cleveland. However, the difference in the amount of white and non-white heads of household that work in East Cleveland was statistically significant. Seventy Seven percet of non-white heads of household held jobs there compared to the 82.7% of white heads of household9. The authority figures of the homes, those that would be most influential in how other members (especially children) view others, have fewer opportunities to interact with each other. This loss limits the ability of persons from different backgrounds to combat the barriers that make relating to each other more difficult to begin with, constituting another fragmenting cycle.

The division between communities was strong was considering social and cultural factors. Two determining factors of differing social classes are occupation and education of populations. The difference in types of occupations held by persons in different areas was significant. In areas of concentrated white populations the rate of employed persons in sales, clerical, professional and managerial positions was 36.6. In areas of concentrated non-white populations the figure was 19.3%.

Irritating the division amongst communities in post-war industrial cities is an alienation felt towards the rest of the county. An attitude of “we helped you in war, now where are you when we need help?” proliferates. This attitude gives populations an insular mindset. They believe that their possible reality consists only of the deterioration surrounding them, and no one is interested in their well being any longer.

The rate of persons over the age of 25 having some college education was 21.3% in white areas, while the average figure for all of the tracts in Hough was just over 10. There is a significant statistical difference between the education level and occupation type of whites and non-whites. This shows that social class was likely to be divided along racial line. Because of this the difference would feel more distinct, and the boundaries more daunting to breach10.

A substantial factor in the drawing of social and cultural boundaries are the rates of involvement and apparent investment in the community. It was found that non-whites have a much higher rate of membership to local organizations. This could mean a group connected to the church, a fraternal organization, or what is predominant, a labor union.11

On average, whites were much more likely to have plans to move. The most extreme example of this is the tract L-4, from which 61.1% of whites as opposed to 16.2% of non-whites had plans to move. It was also recorded that non-whites were twice as likely as whites to buy a house.

Another factor which correlates with investment in a community is relatives that also inhabit the area. The percentage of whites with relatives living in Hough was 38.2. The percentage of non-whites who shared the area with relatives was 60.5. A larger percentage of white persons had relatives outside of Hough than non-whites. Many more whites than non-whites also had no relatives in Cleveland.12

In 1960, half of the population of the Hough was no longer there13. Ninety percent of the non-whites had lived there for five or less years, while roughly 60% of whites had lived there for as long. With a great bulk of the population having spent less than five years in the area, very few families were likely to have any kind of history with Hough14. Less familiarity leaves more room for apathy of citizens for a community, which would decrease investment in the communities. Further evidence of a lack investment in communities is the frequent withdrawal from and enrollment in new schools of high school age students.

At the start of the 1960s, Addison Junior High School faced a major concern in locating and counseling in-migrant students (a term whose definition subsumes any student who moved into the school system 2 or less years ago) to help them adapt to the new environment. With most students possessing an average of a third grade reading level, students needed all of the attention that could possibly be given to them. This was very difficult to accommodate due to the unstable conditions in which the students lived at home in areas of high crime and divorce rates. Addison was fed by the area making up Police Zone 531, recognized as leading the city of Cleveland in terms of crime rate, and murder rate specifically15.

When polled about how they felt toward their neighborhood, 62% of non-whites said they thought Hough was a good place to raise children. Only 27% of whites agreed. Roughly a quarter of these dissenters cited “poor race situation” as their reason, in reference to the disproportionate amount of non-white residents. The boundary implied here is also reflected in the fact that a greater portion of non-whites allow their children to play outside of the home than whites.

Along more cultural lines, there was also a religious boundary. The majority of whites were Catholic, while the majority of non-whites were Baptists. It is likely that this difference was accounted for mostly by the fact that most new non-white families(and most non-white were new) had moved up from the southern parts of the country. These families came to Cleveland hoping to leave behind the South’s caste system-like conventions for a better chance at a better job. However most were quick to realize that northern whites frequently held the same perceptions of caste.16

Leisure time that was not given to local organizations was frequently conducive to solitariness, at least between small areas if not families or even individuals. The three most common leisure time activities were watching television, reading, and fixing up the house. Over three quarters of the population was recorded in a census as watching television every day.17

Politically, Hough also finds itself in a difficult place. Hough itself does not have a local government. The name is used to refer to a collection of neighborhoods rather than any political unit. Therefore it must rely on larger city government if it hopes for political recourse. Many blacks already had this predilection toward larger government because benefits that could be sought if income was low were issued by federal government.

This dynamic situated blacks to swim against a political current. Many government officials tended to see a mass appeal to government for economic support as evocative of federalized health care programs common to socialism and the sort of big statism that would become highly stigmatized as the decade progressed. The Cold War sentiments afloat in the government served as an unfortunate and detrimental context in which to seek political recourse. A further impediment was that in the elections immediately preceding the 1960s, blacks had voted against giving more power to the city government that could help them. Many feared the dilution of power that could be gained by the formation of smaller organizations within the community.

Ralph Besse, owner of the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, was a businessman and philanthropy advocate that helped organizations such as the United Freedom Movement and the Citizens United for Adequate Welfare with ideas for the community. In a speech given to the Rotary Club of Cleveland, Besse showed great insight into the city’s political climate. He would say that blacks deserved to be free from discrimination, and most white business would admit to this. It was evident, however, that whites had great difficulty overcoming prejudices because many would wait until a situation became bad enough that self interest and practical rather than moral concerns would motivate them to promote change. Even then, the change pushed for was limited and gradual.

The Greater Cleveland Association Foundation would pay heed to Besse’s words. They attempted to seek recourse through philanthropy but found difficulty communicating with the black community. Cleveland Metropolitan Services was commissioned to perform a study of the black community. The study, however, failed to touch on issues of great concern such as housing. The lack of communication is probably due to the fact that blacks were failed to be invited to the initial meetings of the study. Yet another inefficiency of the GACF was evidenced by sentiments expressed by several members at a meeting. This is best represented by a statement one was quoted giving: “these trustees of Cleveland Foundation funds and these advisors always worry about what some dead man wanted us to do with his money.”18

The political sphere faces difficulty in providing neighborhoods with needed funding. This only adds to the disillusion of these neighborhoods’ residents, cementing their mentalities in modes of division and helplessness. On July 18th of 1966 the tension in Hough became too great and race riots broke out. The incident that sparked the riot was a dispute in which a white worker refused to serve a black patron a glass of water at a café along Hough Street. An argument ensued and before long escalated to the point where police could not prevent conflict. Rock throwing, looting, vandalism and arson spread throughout the Hough area, and repeated the following evening. On the evening of the 20th, the National Guard was called in to quell the violence. By the time the riots were completely subdued on the 25th, 4 people had been killed, approximately 30 had been injured and 300 arrested after over 240 fires had been reported.19

Notes

1 “Hough” Encyclopedia of Cleveland History CWRU. 20 Nov. 2005 <http://ech.cwru.edu/ech-cgi/article.pl?id=H6>.

2 Keating, W. D., Norman Krumholz, and David C. Perry, Cleveland: A Metropolitan Reader Kent, Ohio: Kent State UP, 1995, 32

3 Sussman, Marvin B., and R. C. White, Hough, Cleveland, Ohio: A Study of Social Life and Change Cleveland, Ohio: The Press of Western Reserve University, 1959, 14-17.

4 6″Summary of the Preliminary Plan for the Hough Community” Cleveland, Ohio: City Planing Commission, 1957, 2.

5 “Summary of the Preliminary Plan for the Hough Community” Cleveland, Ohio: City Planing Commission, 1957, 5.

6 Sussman, Marvin B., and R. C. White, Hough, Cleveland, Ohio: A Study of Social Life and Change Cleveland, Ohio: The Press of Western Reserve University, 1959, 42.

7 Sussman, Marvin B., and R. C. White, Hough, Cleveland, Ohio: A Study of Social Life and Change Cleveland, Ohio: The Press of Western Reserve University, 1959, 41.

8 Sussman, Marvin B., and R. C. White, Hough, Cleveland, Ohio: A Study of Social Life and Change Cleveland, Ohio: The Press of Western Reserve University, 1959, 13.

9 Sussman, Marvin B., and R. C. White, Hough, Cleveland, Ohio: A Study of Social Life and Change Cleveland, Ohio: The Press of Western Reserve University, 1959, 42-43.

10 Sussman, Marvin B., and R. C. White, Hough, Cleveland, Ohio: A Study of Social Life and Change Cleveland, Ohio: The Press of Western Reserve University, 1959, 35-36.

11 Sussman, Marvin B., and R. C. White, Hough, Cleveland, Ohio: A Study of Social Life and Change Cleveland, Ohio: The Press of Western Reserve University, 1959, 59.

12 Sussman, Marvin B., and R. C. White, Hough, Cleveland, Ohio: A Study of Social Life and Change Cleveland, Ohio: The Press of Western Reserve University, 1959, 9-10.

13 “Hough” Encyclopedia of Cleveland History CWRU. 20 Nov. 2005 <http://ech.cwru.edu/ech-cgi/article.pl?id=H6>.

14 Sussman, Marvin B., and R. C. White, Hough, Cleveland, Ohio: A Study of Social Life and Change Cleveland, Ohio: The Press of Western Reserve University, 1959, 9-10.

15 “Great Cities – Grey Areas Program” Cleveland, Ohio: Hough Community Project, 1960, 3-4.

16 Sussman, Marvin B., and R. C. White, Hough, Cleveland, Ohio: A Study of Social Life and Change Cleveland, Ohio: The Press of Western Reserve University, 1959, 29.

17 Sussman, Marvin B., and R. C. White, Hough, Cleveland, Ohio: A Study of Social Life and Change Cleveland, Ohio: The Press of Western Reserve University, 1959, 64.

18 Rose, Kenneth W., The Politics of Social Reform in Cleveland, 1945-1967 : Civil Rights, Welfare Rights, and the Response of Civic Leaders Cleveland, Ohio: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1988, 226-32.

19 “The Hough Riots” Encyclopedia of Cleveland History CWRU 20 Nov. 2005 <http://ech.cwru.edu/ech-cgi/article.pl?id=HR3>.

Money and Mobilization: Volunteers in the Stokes Mayoral Campaign by Elis Ribeiro

From CWRU

http://www.case.edu/artsci/sixties/elis.html

Money and Mobilization: Volunteers in the Stokes Mayoral Campaign
by Elis Ribeiro

Carl Stokes’s narrow win could not have happened without the mobilization of his large African-American bloc vote and the small but significant portion of the white vote. These votes were delivered in 1967 by volunteers who offered their time, strength, and money in order to guarantee victory. While other important factors affected Clevelanders in their voting choices, it was the work of volunteers, who physically brought out the votes for Stokes and gave him the winning edge in both the primaries and general election of 1967. By drawing on their efforts from Stokes’s first mayoral race in 1965, volunteers were able to perfect their campaigning system. During his victory speech, Carl Stokes referred to his supporters, stating that “never has one man owed so much to so many.”1 While it may seem like political jargon, his narrow victory over Republican Seth Taft clearly shows the importance of Stokes’s volunteers.
The grass roots support for Carl Stokes’s mayoral campaign began even before he had intended to run. In fact, it was because of two women that Stokes entered the 1965 mayoral race. Geraldine Williams and Jean Murrell Capers, both active community leaders in Cleveland, went to Columbus, Ohio, where Carl Stokes was a State Representative, to convince him to run for Mayor of Cleveland. Stokes responded by telling them to get 20,000 signatures, 5,000 more than what was needed to run as an independent.2 The women returned to Cleveland and were able to gather about 25,000 signatures, with a significant white percentage.3 Carl Stokes realized he had a legitimate chance in the election and used these signatures to enter his Independent bid into the 1965 Mayoral race.

Stokes had decided to run as an independent, instead of as a Democrat, because it would mean that he could bypass the primaries, causing a four-way general election, where he could try to secure a plurality of votes in his favor. However, because he had registered as an Independent, he had no support from the political institutions that had helped to put him into the Ohio State Legislature. Therefore, he had to rely on his inexperienced but passionate volunteers. Through their work, his campaign became entirely a grass-roots effort.

To enlist volunteers, the Stokes for Mayor Committee had various means of reaching out to people. They had applications in the headquarters office, solicited through mailings, and had advertisements in the newspaper asking for volunteers. Outside supporters also helped them gain volunteers by holding speeches and rallying events.4 One volunteer said that “as each person was called in by Mr. Stokes himself or someone close to him, they stuck and brought in others.”5

In regards to African-Americans, the main strategy was to register voters and then get them to the polls on Election Day. They were the group that Stokes needed because they constituted almost 40% of the Cleveland population.6 The campaign committee, under the guidance of Marvin Chernoff, a 35 year-old office machine salesman turned volunteer, created an organizational hierarchy to have as much control and activity occurring at the rank-and-file level as possible.7 The highest level for a volunteer was as a block supervisor, who would maintain supervision over thirty to forty neighboring houses. Underneath them would be street captains who helped the block supervisors with organizing their streets.8 Together, they would blanket the neighborhoods with street signs, brochures, and visits reminding neighbors when to vote. The hierarchy structure allowed communication to flow easily among those involved in the campaign.9

In the 1965 Mayoral race however, Stokes lost the election against Ralph Locher, the incumbent Democratic mayor, by less than one half of one percent of the votes. Still he finished second out of the four candidates. The loss was actually beneficial to Stokes because it proved that he had a strong chance at a later victory. Many African Americans, who did not vote, had done so because they felt that Stokes did not have any chance to win.10 With the narrow loss, many people later realized that their vote could make a difference.

It was also a learning experience for all the volunteers involved. They had learned that the Block Supervisor strategy worked to mobilize voters, but more importantly showed what areas needed more support. Furthermore, the results showed that Stokes needed to draw more white supporters, of which only 3% voted for him in 1965.11 By applying these lessons to 1967, Stokes’s organization, with the help of outside volunteers, would be able to draw out the necessary support for his victory.

Between 1965 and 1967, certain events came to the forefront of voters’ concerns. During the beginning of his administration, Mayor Locher developed a sorry record in regards to African-American concerns. City Hall had been unresponsive to the Negro community from the very beginning. Urban Renewal on the East Side was so disastrous that U.S. Secretary Weaver cut off federal funding coming into the city. His administration was already facing strong criticism early on.12

What brought racial issues to the height of Clevelanders’ concerns was the Hough Riots. For Cleveland, the riots symbolized the need for better race relations and law and order. The Riots started on July 18, 1966, when a Cafe in Hough refused to serve an African-American customer water. For a week, Hough was in chaos. By the time the rioting stopped, there were four people dead and millions of dollars in property damage.13

Mayor Locher’s response to the riots was that they had been fueled by Communists. He based this claim on the fact that his investigators had found a connection between the rioters and members of the W.E.B. Dubois Club in Cleveland, a Communist front.14 However, even with this conclusion, no one was charged for instigating the riots. Carl Stokes reacted to Locher’s response by demanding a federal investigation. He wrote to the U.S. Attorney General saying, “As a former assistant prosecutor for four years, I refuse to believe that if the County Grand Jury had evidence to support its conclusions [that Communists instigated the riots] that there isn’t an Ohio law under which those persons could be charged.”15 Others in Cleveland knew that Locher’s claim that it was a communist based problem was used just to avoid the real problems in Cleveland. “Actually, the living conditions were the things that caused the riots,” the Hough Community Relations Director said “They [the rioters] didn’t need any Communists to tell them they were suffering.”16

As racial tensions escalated, Mayor Locher continually refused to meet with African-American community leaders. Other events throughout that year only perpetuated the idea that someone was needed to address these racial issues. By 1967, it became apparent that Mayor Locher would need to start addressing these issues, or get out of the way for someone who could.

In 1967, the mayoral election was receiving national attention because of the strong possibility that Stokes could become the first African-American mayor of a major city. This time around, Stokes decided to run as a Democrat, not as an Independent. He explained his decision by saying “a realistic appraisal of the political situation indicates that the next mayor in Cleveland will be chosen in the Democratic primary.”17 He then explained, “High national officials of the Democratic Party have urged me to enter the primary. So have many rank and file Democrats, and thousands of good citizens whose only concern is the future of Cleveland.”18 In fact, President Johnson had actually helped to persuade Stokes to run as a Democrat, telling Carl that he would have his full support when elected Mayor. 19 Therefore, Stokes assumed that by staying within the party, he would be able to gain their support throughout the election process.

However, little support and much resistance came from the Cuyahoga County Democratic Party (CCDP) throughout this race. During the week before the primaries, the CCDP sent out newsletters stating that Stokes would become the Dictator of Cleveland. It said Stokes would allow Dr. Martin Luther King to take over the city. It asked “Do you want Dr. Martin Luther King and his disciples running your lives? Keep Martin Luther King out of City Hall. Ralph Locher is the mayor of all the people.”20 Furthermore, the CCDP refused to allow Stokes speak at any Party meetings. They claimed that because he had previously run as an Independent, they were entitled to refuse him entrance into party events.21

Unfortunately for the CCDP, this action only brought more positive attention to Stokes. Supporters held protest rallies and demanded that Stokes be allowed a chance to talk. One woman was quoted saying that “It looks like they put the party ahead of the people – the people want to hear Stokes, and the voice of the people should be honored.”22 At a protest rally in Ward 10, someone else argued that “We feel Mr. (Albert S.) [sic] Porter [President of the CCDP] has made a racial issue out of this matter, since Porter permits Mayor Locher, who the party endorsed, and Frank Celeste [the other Democratic Primary candidate], who was not endorsed, to speak before the Democratic Ward clubs, but denies Stokes the same right.”23 Therefore, instead of relying on his party, Stokes had to depend on his volunteers.

Voter drives in African-American neighborhoods were started as soon as Stokes had announced his candidacy. A united effort from the NAACP, The Urban League, and the United Pastor’s Association established a coordinated program to register voters in the inner city. Martin Luther King and other African American figures came to Cleveland to show their support and urge people to register to vote. 24 Later on CORE, which had a strong local chapter in Cleveland, joined with the UPA and SCLC with its mobilization efforts. They donated “several thousand dollars in equipment and supplies. This would include staff workers, researches door to door workers, community relations, and transportation workers some of whom would work on a volunteer basis.”25 In fact, CORE had a $175,000 grant from the Ford Foundation in order to register black voters.26

Call & Post, July 15, 1967. 12A Courtesy of WRHS
Even small community groups came together to start their own registration drives. One early group was called “Teens for Stokes”. A group of about 300 high school students came together for gathering signatures for the candidacy petition to help Stokes file as a candidate. After he announced his candidacy, they held social events to gather support. For example, they would hold dance-offs where teams would compete against each other, dancing to live bands. 27 These events brought the community together and let people have fun while registering to vote, donating money or signing up to volunteer.28

These efforts were separate from those of Stokes’s own mobilization campaign. They launched a voter registration project in eight East-Side wards. This effort began early and was carried on very quietly. The Stokes for Mayor effort made sure to separate themselves from the outside groups, for fear of the backlash among white voters.29 They first targeted citizens who had been dropped off of the voting registers for changing their name, moving, or not voting in the past four years.30 Using the 1965 Block Supervisor model, this time they were able to have over 2,000 supervisors who worked the streets in a massive effort to contact every person on their block with a listed telephone.31 After someone registered, they received a bright orange sticker saying “Registered, STOKES, Vote Primary, Vote STOKES”32

Besides simply signing people up on their own, volunteers also drove citizens to the Board of Elections offices to register. Again organized by the united NAACP, SCLC, and CORE efforts, car-pools took thousands of voters in the downtown area to register. In a period of three weeks, it was estimated that over 3,000 people were driven downtown to register, with an average of 177 people per day. One of the most targeted areas was the Hough neighborhood, which saw 432 new registrants due to the car pools.33 However, the city did try to prevent these efforts by forcing car pool drivers to move their cars, threatening to ticket them.34

To gain white voter support, Carl Stokes needed financial resources to create mainstream ads and appeal. Outside volunteer organizations were important to this financial support. The added emphasis for funding is seen by the increase in contributions between 1965 and 1967. In 1965, Stokes had only $40,000 for his campaign, but in 1967 he had over $250,000.35 While much of this money was donated by business leaders who had been swayed by Stokes’s personality, many significant donations were made by collections from the communities. Any donation was appreciated, and people were ready to give Stokes their financial support. Less than a week after Stokes filed as a candidate, a thirteen-year-old girl donated her entire piggy bank savings to his campaign.36 Every little bit did add up for support.

Professionals also came together and donated considerable amounts to Stokes’ campaign. For example, Lawyers for Stokes donated 5,000 dollars to his campaign. Also, Dents for Stokes, a group of dentists, donated 5,350 dollars.37 Members or labor groups came together to donate as well. A group of African-American plumbers in the Cleveland area each sent checks for undisclosed amounts to the Stokes’ for Mayor committee.38 African-American professionals would also hold fundraising dinners to raise thousands of dollars as well. 39

Letterhead of Feminine Touch, 1967. Courtesy of WRHS
Others developed unique and different methods of fundraising. For example, “The Feminine Touch,” also known as “Thins for Stokes,” was a group started by one woman. Similar to a pyramid program, she asked one hundred women to head up nine teams with thirty-six workers.40 Between September 18th and 27th, each woman involved was asked to find ten friends to donate $1. In turn, each of her friends was to ask ten friends for a donation and to recruit ten more friends 41 With 46 members on each team raising $10, each team would have $460. If each team brought in their required amount, the one hundred teams would have raised $46,000. The idea symbolized how simply donating a small amount could do so much. In two weeks, they were able to raise over $24,000.42

The Stokes campaign adopted this idea by promoting people to donate one dollar to the campaign through his own ads.43 Whenever the campaign received a dollar, they replied with a thank-you letter. The letter acknowledged that “One dollar can still buy four quarts of milk, twenty nickel candy bars, three packs of cigarettes, or a night at the movies.” Instead of spending on food or entertainment, they were contributing towards making Cleveland a better place.44

These financial donations were used to wage an advertising campaign to woo white voters. Learning from the previous election, the Stokes campaign knew that they had to draw in more white support to guarantee a victory. Thus, the advertising campaign was used in television and radio spots, newspaper ads, and literature to attract swing voters.45 Stokes recorded various television spots ranging from 30 second ads to 5 minutes of him discussing issues such as jobs and urban renewal.46 While his 5 minute clips had him talking in depth, the 30 second ads tended to focus on race relations and law and order, pushing the message that Carl Stokes could help unify Cleveland. For example, one commercial had a police officer, alone in a locker room, putting on riot gear. The narrator meanwhile stated “Some people go to a lot of trouble to go out Saturday night. It doesn’t have to be.” 47 The Stokes campaign made sure to send out the message that he was a leader for all people, who could bring back unity and prosperity to Cleveland.48

Another key demographic that financial resources were used to attract was the Hispanic population of the West Side.49 His pamphlets, showing his opinion on Cleveland issues, were printed in Spanish and distributed in these areas.50 Carl Stokes spent numerous days there campaigning to prove to the primarily Puerto Rican area that he could address their needs. He would go to community dances and social events to appeal to the larger groups.51 While many of the other ethnic neighborhoods on the West Side were not as receptive to Stokes, the Hispanic community felt he could best serve their needs. Ultimately, they contributed a 2,000 solid voter bloc for Stokes.52

On the Primary Election Day, over 5,000 volunteers came out to make sure things ran smoothly. Within the campaign, Block Supervisors had gone door to door putting up notices on every door knob saying “stop- have you voted today?”53 Later in the day they went door-knocking to make sure people were going out to vote. Poll watchers would count up votes to predict the results. In fact, they were within 10 votes of the actual results. 54 They also made sure to note the amount of activity at each precinct. If there were too few people voting, they would have volunteers sent to neighborhoods to encourage voters. 55

One important group of volunteers on Election Day was made of college students. Bill Hunter, a recent college graduate, traveled around to thirty different colleges in Ohio to recruit students to help with the campaign.56 He appealed to them by claiming the election was an important facet of the civil rights fight. Many of these students were not African-American but did feel strongly about civil rights. Even before October 3rd, they were helping out by working the telephones and licking stamps. 57

However, on Primary Day, they came on buses or in their own cars to help out. They would baby-sit children while the homeowner would be driven to their polling places by other students.58 Around 50 students came from Oberlin College, 35 from Kent State, and two busloads came from Central State. Even students from other states came to help. Emma Willard College, in Troy, New York, brought in students to observe the campaign activity for a class, as well as help out between taking notes.59

Carl B. Stokes won the Democratic Primary on October 3, 1967. While the CCDP formally backed Stokes, they still provided little support. Between the Primaries and the General Election, the volunteer tasks were solely focused on voter education. Unlike the 1965 campaign, where Stokes was an Independent, this election had two voting days. Few newly registered voters understood that Stokes was not yet the Mayor. So, the NAACP and Urban League, as well as other grassroots organizations, launched a voter education drive. They had trained instructors to teach voter education to their own mass meetings, small groups, street and neighborhood clubs, and civic groups.60 Even the Call & Post printed weekly information about the general election ballot to make sure people were prepared for the General Election.61

The General Election Day efforts were similar to those of the Primaries, except they were even more prepared. Members of the Stokes for Mayor Campaign had sent out questionnaires to all poll workers to gather enough information about what needed to change. Out of 3,500 forms, 2,100 were returned. The results were used to judge what areas needed more support at polling places, who needed more training, and which areas could use a higher turnout.62

On the General Election Day, the campaign made sure to fix those problems. For example, more college students were in areas where they would be needed to drive people to polls or baby-sit while someone went to vote. Also, more poll watchers were placed in transitional wards, which were areas with an equal amount of African-Americans and White voters, where there had been problems before. By learning the details of each precinct during the October primary, volunteers were able to apply these lessons to November 7th. 63

By the end of the night, as the results of the primarily African-American wards came in, it was clear that Carl Stokes would be Mayor. It was through mass mobilization of eligible voters that the 1967 election had one of the highest voter participation in Cleveland history. The turnout in African-American wards was 80%, the highest ever, with over 90% voting for Carl Stokes. Instead of the 18% of white ward support, it was over 20%.In transitional wards, with 79.1% voter turnout, 60.5% voted for Stokes. Stokes won with only 50.5% of the votes. With half a percent of a lead, Carl B. Stokes became Cleveland’s 50th mayor and the Nation’s first African-American mayor of a large city.64

Stokes volunteers did whatever was needed in order to bring out the African-American votes. Through the financial contributions of community members, Carl Stokes was able appeal to enough white and ethnic voters to receive a substantial percent of the votes. It took the 1965 election to perfect the grass roots technique to put the first African American into the City Hall of a major city. In an election as close as the one in 1967, frustrations with the previous administration and racial tensions were not the motivating only force behind bringing out the voters. It was those who were going through neighborhoods and encouraging people to vote. It was the volunteers.

About the Author:
Elis Ribeiro is a junior at Case Western Reserve University majoring in Political Science and History. She is originally from Ellicott City, Maryland. Since her freshman year she has worked for the Undergraduate Admissions Office. Currently she is the Vice President and Webmaster of Case Democrats. She is also a member of Phi Delta Theta, the History Honors Society, and Pi Sigma Alpha, the Political Science Honors Society. Next semester, she will be interning in Washington, DC. After graduation, she plans to attend Law School in the DC area.

Endnotes

1 Eyes on the Prize II. writ. and prod. by Judy Vecchione, v.9. PBS Video, 2000, videocassette.. [18:20]

2 Stokes, Carl. “Excerpts from Promises of Power: An Autobiography.” Cleveland Plain Dealer Sept. 24, 1973, 1A.

3 Nelson, William E. and Merento, Phillip J., Electing Black Mayors Columbus: Ohio State University Press, c1977, 91.

4 “The Campaign Plan to Elect Carl B. Stokes as Mayor of Cleveland, Ohio” Carl B. Stokes Papers, Container 1, Folder 9. WHRS.

5 as quoted in Nelson and Merento, 96.

6 Nelson and Merento, 91.

7 Sheridan, Terence. “Volunteer Block Supervisors were Key to Stokes’ Victory” Cleveland Plain Dealer October 5, 1967, 9A.

8 “Letter to Street Captains” Carl B. Stokes Papers, Container 6, Folder 87, Volunteers. WRHS

9 Nelson and Merento, 124.

10 “Stokes Victory Depends on Negro Registration” Call & Post. August 19, 1967, 4B.

11 Cuyahoga County Board of Election Results from 1965

12 Roberts, John W. “How to Beat City Hall” Grass Roots, Fall 1967, 8.

13 Stokes, Carl. Promises of Power, 94.

14 “Ted Kennedy Seeks Broader Riot Probe” Cleveland Press August 11, 1967, A14.

15 “Stokes Calls on US to Probe Hough Riots” Carl B. Stokes Papers, Container 4, Folder 65, WRHS.

16 “Jury Hough Report Praised, Belittled” Carl B. Stokes Papers, Container 4, Folder 65, WRHS.

17 “Stokes Files in Primary Race” Call & Post Saturday July 8, 1967, 1A.

18 “Stokes Files in Primary Race” Call & Post Saturday July 8, 1967, 12A.

19 Stokes, Carl. “Excerpts from Promises of Power: An Autobiography.” Cleveland Plain Dealer Sept. 24, 1973, 1A.

20 “Newsletter from Cuyahoga County Democrats Executive Committee” Sept 29, 1967. Carl B. Stokes Papers, Container 5, Folder 75, WRHS.

21 “Ward 13 Dems Revolt, Demand Stokes Speak” Call & Post Saturday, August 26, 1967, 1A.

22 “Ward 13 Dems Revolt, Demand Stokes Speak” Call & Post Saturday, August 26, 1967, 1A.

23 “In Protest Rally: Ministers for Stokes Night for Ward 10 Dems” Call & Post Saturday August 26, 1967, 2A.

24 “Urban League, NAACP Join Voter Drive” Call & Post Saturday July 15, 1967, 1A.

25 “CORE to Announce Plans this Week” Call & Post Saturday August 4, 1967, 1A.

26 Moore, Leonard. Carl B. Stokes and the Rise of Black Political Power, Urbana : University of Illinois Press, c2002, 56.

27 “Young Adults Across City Rally for Stokes” Call & Post Saturday July 15, 1967, 12A.

28 “Teen Walk for Stokes” Call & Post October 7, 1967, 14A.

29 Roberts, 8.

30 “Letter to Volunteers” Carl B. Stokes Papers, Container 6, Folder 87, Voter Registration. WRHS.

31 Roberts, 8.

32 Nelson and Merento, 122.

33 “Car Pools Take Thousands to Register for Primaries” Call & Post Saturday August 12, 1967, 1A.

34 “Voter Registration Volunteers Claim Police Harrassment” Call & Post August 16, 1967, 6A.

35 Moore, Leonard, 55.

36 Williams, Bob “Carl Stokes Seeks Dems Endorsement” Saturday July 15, 1967, 1A.

37 Financial documents in Carl Stokes Papers, Container 5, Folder 78. WRHS.

38 “Plumbers Contribute to Stokes Campaign” Call & Post September 30, 1967, 2A.

39 Nelson and Merento, 130.

40 “The Feminine Touch” Carl B. Stokes Papers, Container 5, Folder 78, Feminine Touch. WRHS.

41 “The Feminine Touch” Carl B. Stokes Papers, Container 5, Folder 78. Feminine Touch. WRHS.

42 Nelson and Merento, 127.

43 Stokes for Mayor Ad, Call & Post August 19, 1967. 3A.

44 “One Dollar Thank-You” Carl B. Stokes Papers, Container 5, Folder 75. WRHS.

45 “A Ostrow Campaign Strategy for Carl Stokes” 18 June 1967, Carl Stokes Papers, Container 1, Folder 9, WRHS.

46 Various transcripts of TV spots, Carl B. Stokes Papers, Container 1, Folder 9, WRHS.

47 “Saturday Night” and “Long, Hot Summer” from Political Advertising in the 60s, London International Advertising Awards, 1992, Videocassette.

48 Moore, 58.

49 Roberts, 6.

50 Various brochures, Carl B. Stokes Papers, Container 6, Folder 91. WRHS.

51 “La Bamba” Carl B. Stokes Papers. Container 6, Folder 91. WRHS.

52 Nelson and Merento, 136.

53 Roberts, 10.

54 Roberts, 8.

55 Roberts, 10.

56 Nelson, and Merento, 129.

57 Roberts, 10.

58 Roberts, 10.

59 “Collegians Trek here for Stokes Campaign” Call & Post November 11, 1967, 1A.

60 “Accent Moves to Voter Education” Call & Post September 16, 1967, 3A.

61 Call & Post, October 14, 1967-November 4, 1967, 2A

62 Nelson, and Merento, 148

63 Nelson, and Merento, 148

64 Cuyahoga County Board of Election Results from 1967

Hough Riots: The Aftermath by Brigette Bencoe

Article on the Hough riots from CWRU

Hough Riots: The Aftermath
by Brigette Bencoe

The predominately black Hough neighborhood of Cleveland, Ohio, encompasses the area between Euclid Avenue and Superior Avenue (running east and west), and East 55th and East 105th (running north and south). On Monday, July 18th, 1966, a disagreement occurred between a white cafe owner and the black community of the Hough neighborhood. This disagreement led to a state of violence and turmoil in the area that lasted until the Cleveland National Guard restored order a week later. This week-long period of civil disorder in Cleveland history was remembered as the Hough Riots. The Hough Riots was considered “one of the most serious outbreaks of civil disorder in the city’s history” 1 .

The aftermath of the riots produced activism from residents and leaders alike in Cleveland. The Hough neighborhood had the potential for improvement with the creation of the urban renewal programs Cleveland NOW!, Hough Area Development Corp (HADC), Special Impact Program funded by Office of Equal Opportunity, and the Neighborhood Youth Corp. The recently elected African American Mayor, Carl Stokes, represented a fresh start for the city and its black population. However, implementation of the urban renewal programs often fell short of proposed goals due to sparse funds, fraudulent practices and disorganization. Racial tensions seemed to escalate and result in more violence. Mayor Stokes was unable to achieve much success after the riots due to the problematic state of the Hough slum and continued racial violence. Progress to improve Hough was counteracted by the shortcomings of urban renewal programs, the escalation of racial violence, and the absence of affective results from Carl Stokes.

The Seventy-Niners’ Cafe located on the corner of East 79th street and Hough Avenue was an establishment owned by a white man named Dave Feigenbaum, who has been known to discriminate against, and often times refuse service to, Hough’s black community. On July 18, 1966, at the Seventy-Niners’ Cafe, arguments occurred between Dave Feigenbaum and two members of the black community. The first incident occurred when a black prostitute solicited bar customers for funds to benefit a deceased prostitute’s children. When Feigenbaum asked the prostitute to leave, she showed some resistance and quarreled with him until he finally got her to leave. Residual tensions from this incident set the stage for Feigenbaum’s next encounter with a black man who requested water to accompany his order. Feigenbaum claimed he could not serve the man because he was ordering out. He further instructed the barmaids not to serve water to blacks, and posted a sign on the door that read “no water for niggers (sic)” 2 . Once the news of the incidents spread, frustrations peaked in the ghetto and led to the start of the riots.

One day after the riots began (July 19th), the Cleveland paper, the Plain Dealer, ran the front page headline, “Woman Killed in Hough Violence”3 . Twenty-six year old Joyce Arnett was ushered into a nearby apartment by police, where she became frantic about the safety of her children. She poked her head out the window of a building to announce that she was going to leave the building, at which point she was shot in the head and chest by three stray bullets from an unknown sniper4 . The article also mentioned fire bombs, shots by snipers (most likely by Hough gang members), fires and looting as other forms of civil disorder5 . While Hough only encompassed approximately two square miles, the riot had fanned out to ten square miles6 .

Chaos mounted to such a level that Cleveland Mayor Ralph Locher called in one thousand Cleveland National Guardsmen. On the night of the National Guardsmen arrived, Percy Giles, a black man, was killed amidst a rapid exchange of gunfire between police and snipers. The most danger from the riots occurred in the first few days, after which the Guard began to take control of the situation. Four deaths occurred during the riots and countless looters and vandals were arrested. The following table shows a compilation of the statistics gathered in a report by the National Guard recounting their post in Hough 7 .

Day
Total Fire Runs Total Actual Fires Total Police Runs

Tues 19 – Wed 27 532 423 1779

Wed 27 – Sun 31 ************* NORMAL *************

In the wake of the violent activities, many asked the question, “Why had the riots occurred?” The Hough Riots are an example of a much larger underlying problem during this time period: “racial injustice and second class status for black citizens”8 . The frustration of poor housing, unemployment and poverty due to second-class citizenship led the younger generations in Hough to seek attention through radical means. The older generation of the Hough community felt it was the “militant youth” that produced the catastrophe of the riots9 . Cleveland Community Relations board director Bertram Gardner, stated that 90-95% of Hough does not agree with the methods and demonstrations of the riot. He said that it was “black nationalism acted out by the wrong people”10 . They felt less destruction and anger could have resulted from tactics from the Martin Luther King Jr. Era.

The riots exposed Hough as a struggling slum and the Cleveland community could no longer ignore its problems. Of foremost importance was the election of Carl Stokes as mayor, because it marked the start of a “new and brighter period in the history of Cleveland, Ohio”11 . To the black population in Cleveland, Mr. Stokes was a breath of fresh air in comparison to the neglect of Mayor Locher and his administration. In fact, the loyalty of the black population to Mr. Stokes prevented a riotous outbreak the summer of 1967, one year after the Hough Riots. Stokes was the mastermind behind the formation of Cleveland: NOW! organization in 1968 that specifically dealt with the urban renewal and revitalization of black ghettos. The organization’s priorities were housing, creation of jobs, city planning, and health care.

In 1967, The Hough Area Development Corp (HADC) was established to “bring economic prosperity to Cleveland’s Hough neighborhood”12 . HADC promoted the creation of black businesses and fostered entrepreneurship. One major component of the organization was the Handyman Maintenance Company which trained unemployed residents and found them work as maintenance men. A report written by the members of the corporation in January of 1969 listed many activities that the Hough residents could be involved with during the rehabilitation of their neighborhood. These activities included recreation centers, Police Athletic League, Good Samaritan Youth Center, Hough Housing Corp and the Opportunities Industrialization Center where job training could be received13 .

The Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) became involved with raising the standards of the Hough men and women. They funded the Special Impact Program in 1968 to offer the impoverished the opportunity to use the free enterprise systems to become independent and self-supporting. It was created to reverse the economic decline in the Hough area, which was about 15.7% at the time. The programs were designed in hopes of significantly changing the problems of unemployment, dependency and community tensions in Hough14 . The OEO realized that the Special Impact program could be more effective if it had the supervision of the HADC. Many important works grew out of the unification of Special impact and the HADC. Some of the most important were the Martin Luther King Jr. Plaza shopping center, the chain of McDonald’s restaurants, and the Homes for Hough. Loan programs provided funding for private businesses in Hough and through the purchase of the primarily white-operated McDonald’s restaurant, HADC provided blacks who had previously experienced discrimination at McDonalds a place to find work and enjoy a meal15 .

Due to the fact that Hough had become dominated by youth and young adults, it made sense to establish programs to keep them busy and out of trouble. Summer jobs for youth from impoverished families were used to successfully to steer them away from potential trouble. The one-million dollar program had 1350 youth and 262 young adults involved, most within the ages of fifteen and the late twenties. The Neighborhood Youth Corp was intended for 940 teenagers, but 1460 had come to attend the program16 . The most important accomplishment these statistics show is that the people of Hough were taking the initiative to better themselves and their community.

The task of rebuilding the Hough neighborhood following its many years of neglect seemed almost impossible. Marjorie Buckholz, author of “Twenty-three Years of Work to Improve the Hough Area”, foreshadowed the trials of advancing a broken community such as Hough when she wrote in October of 1966:

Basically, the same problems are there that were neglected twenty years ago. The city lacks a large-range plan for the area within which groups and organizations which want to help can fit their efforts. There is little evidence of courage or of conviction that a plan if created will be implemented. The deterioration of buildings and of human beings who live in this environment continues. It is spreading to other adjacent sections of the city in the same way that it spread in the Hough Area a decade ago.

Her declaration was just the beginning of many criticisms of the rehabilitation efforts of Hough. The ambiguity of the “large-range plan” Cleveland h17 oped to execute was exposed through these criticisms.

When the troops were leaving Hough, they mentioned the “evils” of poverty that caused the “lack of opportunity and initiative” that plagued the community18 . The Hough community’s lack of hope and defiance of the law could not have been seen in a clearer light than through the destruction caused on the fifth day of rioting. A seven story apartment building on East 59th street had been recently purchased by HOPE (Housing Our People Economically) to be renovated to offer low-income housing options to the residents of Hough. It, along with a recreation center called University Party Center, was destroyed by fire and vandalism during the riots19 . With such a lack of respect from the community toward improvements in progress prior to the riots, it is not surprising that the programs that were established after the riots would meet a similar fate.

A major issue was the missing link between the creation of urban renewal programs and the implementation of them. An article in the New York Times, dated February 23rd, 1968, informed its readers that at that point in time, six projects had been started, none finished, and six more had been formulated but not started. Six thousand-plus acres of land had been reserved for renewal, “nearly twice that of any other city”20 . The irony behind all of this was that while no city had ever put so much time and supposed effort into creating and formulating programs, no major city had a project completion rate as low as Cleveland’s. The inactivity of the Cleveland city council was brought to the attention of officials in the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development. The officials involved in the department were so “disgusted” with the failure in Cleveland that, in 1967, they cut off access to the ten million dollars in “additional renewal funds that had been allocated for Cleveland”21 .

The Special Impact program did not find much success. It got off to a slow start and business in Hough seemed to remain stagnant. The different programs that grew out of HADC and Special Impact had made very few strides as of February 1971, more than two and one half years later22 . Loan programs and other community projects were anticipated to be the most helpful institutions, but did not bring the success many had hoped. The Martin Luther King Jr. Plaza project started late, and since many businesses had left Hough because of the riots, it was hard to find interested vendors23 . Homes for Hough, as of February 1971, had built three family-sized homes and completed one half of the anticipated plans for town homes. The original projection for completion by Homes for Hough was to have fifty units available to residents by 196924 .

The HADC was criticized for not having the “know-how to devise an effective plan”25 . Lack of support from the community as a whole, and the haphazard and rushed formation of HADC, could be reasons why this conclusion was drawn. In addition, the organization did not see the “deficient housing and services” that littered Hough as a threat to the Cleveland Community until it was too late to make immediate progress in the wake of the riots26 . Inefficiency, neglect and the lack of understanding were not just problems within the HADC; most urban renewal programs were similarly afflicted.

The Cleveland NOW! organization started by Carl Stokes experienced a bout of fraudulent activity that permanently damaged the reputation of the association. Fred “Ahmed” Evans, a man closely associated with the militant groups thought as catalysts of the riots, was a member of the Black Nationalist group in Hough. He was able to channel funds from the Cleveland NOW! program through the HADC because it was funding private businesses in Hough. The private business that Evans was involved in was called the African Cultural Shop. He used the money provided for this shop to buy guns for his Nationalist members when racial tensions were at an all-time high during the few years immediately following the riots27 . After Evans’ unlawful actions, the Cleveland NOW! foundation had a very hard time recieving funds, eventually leading to its demise.

There was inconsistency between a couple urban renewal programs. HADC remained active until 1984 while the last major project by Cleveland NOW! was completed in 1970. It failed due to its ties with “Ahmed” Evans and his fraudulent practices. Although, HADC did experience its own turbulent times in the aftermath of the riots. Congressman William E. Marshall criticized the validity of their tax-exempt status, and a Plain Dealer article questioned the effectiveness of their programs28 . These issues may have hampered the abilities of the HADC when it began, but HADC did not experience the negative repercussions Cleveland NOW! did. The inconsistency of urban renewal projects in Cleveland made it hard for many, including organizations willing to endow the projects, to see their value.

While a riot in Hough did not take place, a riot of similar magnitude took place in on July 23rd, 1968 called the Glenville Riots. The money stolen from the Cleveland NOW! program by Fred “Ahmed” Evans was used to fund the violence in Glenville. The Glenville Riots was a shootout initiated by Evans and his militant Nationalist followers and directed at the Cleveland Police Department, which was primarily white. By the end of the shootout, three policemen, four suspects, and one civilian had died while fifteen were wounded29 . Stokes felt that further violence could be stopped if black policemen patrolled Glenville to keep racial tensions under control, while the National Guard and Cleveland Police stayed on the perimeter. No more deaths were reported, but looting and vandalism did occur30 . The Glenville Riots was an explosion of racial tension and another drawback to implementing improvements after the Hough Riots. It slandered the image and hard work of Mayor Carl Stokes and further angered racist whites.

Almost seven months before the Glenville riots was to take place, Stokes faced harsh criticism of what he had done to improve conditions in Cleveland. The unorganization of urban renewal efforts was coupled by poor conditions in Cleveland slums, including Hough, looking “as depressing as ever”31 . Granted, Stokes was dealt a difficult hand by the previous Mayor Ralph Locher. His ineffective and inefficient methods allowed “the city to slide into a sad state of disrepair”32 . Critics realized this and were willing to acknowledge the setbacks of the Stokes administration early in his term as inexperience and adjustment to issues passed onto him as he entered office33 . Yet, despite conditions for which Stokes had no control, or the lack of sufficient time to prove his competence, he had to realize that drastic improvements needed to be made before he would gain the trust of the people of Cleveland.

With Stokes trying to prove his abilities as Mayor, the Glenville Riots did not help positively develop his image. During the riots, Stokes banned whites from the area after the first nights “fire fight” and equipped the area with a black police force, hoping to ease the racial tension and prevent further deaths34 . Stokes and his administration believed that this was a smart move on the part of the mayor, but white policemen believed otherwise. Angered by the death and injury they had already endured, the white policemen saw the move as a “sellout to the black nationalists”35 . Cleveland NOW! had the potential to make great strides in Cleveland’s ghettos, but after Glenville the large funds from big businesses and individual donations left the organization’s collection dry.

Many believed the Mayor had direct contact with Fred “Ahmed” and his squandering of Cleveland NOW! funds. Carl Stokes was summoned to the Probate Court in Cleveland when a complaint was filed saying Stokes “directed” money from the program into the hands of the Black Nationalists and Ahmed, as well as claiming he participated in an “unlawful parade” on the second anniversary of the Hough Riots36 . While proper sources were unavailable to confirm the outcome of the trial, it can be inferred that the complaints were probably invalid and the charges against Stokes were most likely dropped. Regardless of the validity of these statements, the publicity of this complaint would put doubt in the mind of Stokes most avid supporters; maybe even eliminate their support for good.

After the Glenville riots, many were searching for answers as to what could have motivated Evans and his followers to commit such a brutally violent act. In response, a New York Times article read,

From the shabby Hough slums to the luxurious homes in Shaker Heights, Negroes express a conviction that the police are there to abuse them, not to protect them.37

The brutality of the white police force was yet another issue that finally came to the surface in the aftermath of the Hough Riots. The Cleveland Police made comments about needing capital punishment to “keep the Negro in line”, and directed “anti-Negro” statements at Mayor Stokes on the police radio during the Glenville Riots38 . The policemen were angered by Stokes’s decision to keep the Cleveland National Guard and white police out of the area to prevent further violence from racial tensions. Violent eruptions due to police brutality took place throughout the country. A white policeman was killed in New Jersey by black youths when they retaliated against the suppression and discrimination the police employed39 . If the abusive ways of the white police force was not handled properly, the friction would lead to more militancy by blacks and “a growth of fascism among whites”40 . All in all, it was made clear that the racial tension preceding the Hough Riots was increasing, and violence and death seemed to be the ultimate result.

Polarization of the races was also due to violence caused by the white minorities who had “the most to lose in the steady advancement of Negro rights”41 . The Hough neighborhood was surrounded by “unsympathetic neighborhoods of Poles and Italians” who did not want an equalizing of standards in Hough42 . Most of the Italian-Americans, like those who lived in Murray Hill, a neighborhood adjacent to Hough, were unskilled workers who felt that their jobs were in jeopardy. In fact, several major riots of the past were due to extreme competition for the limited jobs and housing that were available43 . More white gangs surfaced that were ready to strike at the militant blacks of Cleveland at any time. Former youth groups in the areas were becoming stomping grounds for “viscously racist” gangs, like the white Chain Gang that practiced shooting guns at “paper targets they [called] ‘niggers’”44 .

The immediate aftermath of the Hough Riots resembles one of triumph and of disappointment. The City of Cleveland finally noticed the “people lost inside a country” and realized that civil disobedience of this magnitude should not be ignored45 . Large corporations within Cleveland and individuals associated with the leadership community of Hough joined forces to combat the devastating conditions of this overcrowded neighborhood in the black ghetto. The many measures taken by citizens of Cleveland to improve Hough were more than any other major city during the Sixties. However, not enough of the proposed goals were met. Racial tension actually increased the violence and, in particular, it seemed to aggravate the white racists. Programs took on too much too soon, and they either failed due to fraudulent practice and incompetence within the organizations, or they were not provided with sufficient funding or support. Mayor Stokes presented a new beginning for Cleveland at its black residents, but the works he initiated did not produce many results and the extreme frustration in Hough played out again in the Glenville Riots. Attitudes within the ghetto did not seem to change, and the prevailing atmosphere of hopelessness felt by the residents did not appear to be heading in an optimistic direction.

The Hough Riots will forever symbolize an important turning point for the City of Cleveland. The riots identified an underlying problem of racial discrimination within poor, black communities among Cleveland’s 876,050 residents (as of 1960) that could no longer go unnoticed. Unfortunately, the city’s leadership at the time could not gain a sufficient understanding of the change needed, and could not implement the solutions they found in enough time to do any immediate good. Furthermore, the Hough community itself displayed little desire to change its ways and better the community. While the direct outcome of the riots did not produce much success, with the help of the new mayor, Carl Stokes, and a change in attitude from the black and white residents alike, the neighborhood made some progress in the years to come.

Link one: http://statenews.org/story_page.cfm?ID=5134&year=2001&month=7
Link two: http://www.clevelandmemory.org/hough/

Notes

1. Mark E. Lackritz. “The Hough Riots of 1966.” Special Collections of the Cleveland
State University Library: 7. http://www.clevelandmemory.org/hough/

2. Lackritz 7

3. “Women Killed in Hough Violence”. Plain Dealer. 19 July 1966: 1

4. Lackritz 8

5. “Women Killed in Hough Violence”. Plain Dealer. 19 July 1966: 1

6. Adjutant General’s Dept. “The Hough riot, Cleveland, Ohio. This report on the role of the Ohio National Guard during the Hough area riots in Cleveland, 18-31 July 1996.” Columbus: Ohio. 1966.

7. Adjutant General’s Dept.

8. Lackritz, 5

9. Robert G. McGruder. “Older People in Hough Want No Part of Trouble”. 20 July 1966

10. Doris O’Donnell. “Rioting Blamed on Negro Frustration.” Plain Dealer 21 July 1966: 9.

11. Lackritz,69.

12. Hough Area Development Corporation Records. Cleveland, OH: Hough Area Development Corp., 1968-1985. Register

13. Hough Area Development Corp, Box 16 Folder 313

14. General Accounting Office. “Development of minority businesses and employment in the Hough area of Cleveland, Ohio, under the special impact program [of the] Office of Economic Opportunity. Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States”. Washington. 1971. 6-8

15. General Accounting Office. 10

16. “Cause of costly riot and unrest may be eliminated by reforms”. Plain Dealer. 23 July 1966

17. Marjorie Buckholz. “Twenty-three years of work to improve the Hough Area”. 1966 25

18. “When troops leave…”. Plain Dealer. 21st July 1966

19. “When troops leave…”. Plain Dealer. 21st July 1966

20. Paul Hoffman. “Stokes Program Gains Momentum”.” New York Times 23 Feb. 1968: 66. ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2002). http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?sid=1&RQT=511&TS=1134527551&clientId=43422&firstIndex=0

21. Hoffman 66

22. General Accounting Office 11

23. General Accounting Office 11

24. General Accounting Office 43

25. Buckholz 24

26. Buckholz 22

27. Cleveland NOW! register

28. Hough Area Development Corporation Records. Register

29. Louis H. Masotti and Jerome R. Cosi. “”Glenville Shootout”” Encyclopedia of Cleveland History. 1969. <http://ech.cwru.edu/ech-cgi/article.pl?id=GS1>. 1

30. Masotti and Cosi 1

31. Hoffman 66

32. Lackritz 66

33. Hoffman 66

34. Anthony Ripley. “Terror in Cleveland.” New York Times 28 July 1968: 136. ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2002). <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?sid=1&RQT=511&TS=1134528104&clientId=43422&firstIndex=10>.

35. Ripley 136

36. “Cleveland’s Mayor Ordered into Court.” New York Times 2 Oct. 1968: 769. ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2002). <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?sid=1&RQT=511&TS=1134528104&clientId=43422&firstIndex=10>.

37. Thomas A. Johnson “The Racial Violence in Cleveland.” The New York Times 3 Sept. 1968: 36. ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2002). <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?

38. Johnson 36

39. Johnson 36

40. Johnson 36

41. David Vienna. ““Black vs. White: Riots in Cleveland, Brooklyn took Ugly Turn”.” Wall Street Journal: 14 March 1967: 1. ProQuest Historical Newspapers The Wallstreet Journal (1889-1988). <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?sid=1&RQT=511&TS=1134530768&clientId=43422&firstIndex=0>..

42. Paul Hoffman. “Cleveland Fears New Outbreaks as It Awaits ‘Nonviolent Action’ by Dr. King; ‘We Need No Sermons’ ‘Cleveland Casbah’ Directive From City Hall Dr. King Assailed Fears Are Voiced.” New York Times 12 May. 1967: 51. ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2002). <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?sid=1&RQT=511&TS=1134530768&clientId=43422&firstIndex=0>.

43. Vienna 1

44. Monroe W. Karmin and David Vienna. “Racial Powder Keg; Negro-White Hostility Mounting in Cleveland As City’s Efforts Fail; Armed Youth Gangs Growing; Mayor Blamed by Business, Established Negro Leaders CORE, Reds, Klan Eye City.” Wall Street Journal 14 Mar. 1967: 1. ProQuest Historical Newspapers The Wallstreet Journal (1889-1988). <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?sid=1&RQT=511&TS=1134530768&clientId=43422&firstIndex=0>.

45. “Despair lights fuse of Bombs in the US Ghetto”. Plain Dealer. 23 July 1966